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Chapter :
The Solution of the Many to the
Problem of Vagueness†
The Problem of Vagueness (PoV) is not an easy one to solve. The most promis-
ing approach to solving the PoV is supervaluationism. On its traditional de-
velopments, however, supervaluationism is saddled with objections, the most
significant of which is the Truth Objection. According to the Truth Objec-
tion, supervaluationism conflicts with the disquotational feature of the truth
predicate as characterized by Tarski’s T-Schema:
(T) ‘p’ is true iff p
instances of which are generated by replacing p with various sentences. There
is a great deal of intuitive support for the T-schema. So when a theory of truth
treats instances of the T-schema as unassertable, it raises the suspicion that the
theorist has failed to give an account of the concept of truth.
†Thanks to Daniel Drucker, Jim Joyce, Jeremy Lent, David Manley, Chip Sebens, and Eric
Swanson for helpful conversations and comments. Special thanks to Brian Weatherson. Thanks
also to participants of the University of Michigan Candidacy Seminar, the :0th Annual Mark
L. Shapiro Graduate Philosophy Conference (and my commentors Geoffrey Grossman and
Yongming Han), and audiences at the University of San Diego and the University of Michigan.
:
The Problem of the Many (PoM) is also not an easy problem to solve. The
two most promising approaches to solving the PoM are the Solution by Vague-
ness and the Solution by Plentitude. According to the Solution by Vagueness,
the PoM is an instance of the PoV. It therefore inherits the objections to so-
lutions to the PoV, such as the Truth Objection. The second approach – the
Solution by Plentitude – treats the PoM as largely independent of the PoV.
In this paper, I will use the tools from the Solution by Plentitude to defend
a version of supervaluationism that I call supersententialism. According to su-
persententialism, instead of speaking a single language with multiple precisifica-
tions, we are simultaneously speaking many precise languages thereby tokening
several precise sentences in a single speech act.
The core insight of my defense is that, on the Solution by Plentitude, the
PoV is an instance of the PoM. In particular, I will show that, by borrowing
tools originally developed for the Solution by Plentitude, supersententialism is
the most plausible form of supervaluationism. If successful, this result would be
significant for two reasons. First, because the Solution by Plentitude has been
developed as an independently promising solution to the PoM, we would have
an independently promising solution to the PoV. Second, if I’m right that, on
the Solution by Plentitude, the PoV is an instance of the PoM, this should lend
plausibility to the Solution by Plentitude over the Solution by Vagueness by
massively increasing the payoff for adopting and developing the former.
Positions related to supersententialism have been considered in the past.:
But when these nearby positions have been considered, the consideration has
been brief and superficial with the result that the view is either quickly set
aside as indefensible or is classified as a mere terminological variant of standard
supervaluationist accounts (Keefe, 2000, :998;Williamson, :994a).
:Supersententialism bears important similarities (and differences) to the views discussed in
Smith (2008, §2.5), Varzi (2007), and Dorr and Hawthorne (20:4) as well as views criticized
by Keefe (2000, :998); Williamson (:994a). While the view of this paper draws inspiration
from these, and other, sources, the view is different in important ways, which will be highlighted
in the course of the paper. See footnotes 5, 6, 7, and §:0.2.
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This has been a mistake. Reflecting on the Problem of the Many reveals
unappreciated benefits and new lines of defense from extant criticisms. In the
end, we get a form of supervaluationism that shares many of the benefits of its
rivals with none of their problems.
: What is Supersententialism?
While supersententialism retains several of the core insights – and the formal
apparatus – of traditional supervaluationism, it is also motivated by the sugges-
tions in Lewis’s early (:969; :970; :975) treatment of vagueness and recent work
on speech act pluralism.
:.: Vagueness Deported from Semantics
Supersententialism is inspired by the comments on vagueness in Lewis’s earli-
est works (:969; :970; :975). In those works, Lewis maintains that languages
are formal objects that are precise in that each language assigns precise truth
conditions to uninterpreted sentences. More specifically, languages are taken to
be functions from uninterpreted sentence-formulas to sentential meanings (for
example, sets of possible worlds). A community c is said to speak a languageL
just in case there prevails, in c , a convention of truthfulness and trust inL .
The conventions of a community can fail to determine a particular language
as the unique language being spoken by that community. At best, the con-
ventions of a language community delimit a class of languages being spoken.
Lewis claims that this failure of convention to settle on a single language is the
source of vagueness. For this reason, he suggests that vagueness arises from our
relationship with these languages rather than from the languages themselves.
Although it is clear from these quotes that early-Lewis locates the source of
vagueness in our relationship with language rather than in the language itself, his
remarks don’t go much beyond this. Linda Burns (:99:, §2.3, §9.5) subsequently
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takes up Lewis’s proposal and develops it into a form of contextualism2: highly
transient facts settle which of the many languages delimited by convention is
being spoken.3
And like their more modern developments (c.f. Fara (2000)), these early
contextualist treatments are implausible. Without offering a detailed criticism
of contextualist treatments of vagueness, I’ll simply note the implausibility of
the claim that contextual features are rich enough to determine a particular
precise language being spoken by a community.4 Nevertheless, there is an im-
portant lesson to be drawn from the Lewis/Burns suggestion: vagueness is a
feature of our relationship with language rather than a feature of the language
we speak.5
:.2 Many Languages and Speech Act Pluralism
Convention only delimits a range of precise Lewisian languages as candidates for
the language we speak. Yet it’s incredible to think contextual non-conventional
facts could help us select one among the candidate languages. So which language
do we speak?
The solution to our quandary comes from reflecting on the recent prolifer-
ation of so-called speech act pluralist (SAP) views. According to these views, a
single speech act – a single communicative act of producing sounds – can express
multiple propositions. Some proponents of SAP (Read, 2009) use the view to
2Thanks to Brian Weatherson for helping me to see this position as a form of contextualism.
3Burns (:99:) says “where there is vagueness speakers must be represented as alternating be-
tween members of a range of such languages" (:82) and “speakers may adopt different languages
from one another and shift from one language to another at different times" (:86). It is less clear
whether Lewis endorsed this contextualism, but he does make comments such as “we are free
to settle these indeterminacies however we like" (:975, :88) and “the different languages of the
cluster...may be differently suited for individual opinions, tastes, and conversational purposes.
If everyone can pick from the cluster, incompatible preferences among languages may all be
satisfied" (:969, 202).
4For further, and related, criticisms of the view, see Keefe (2000, :48) and Stanley (2003).
5Following Burns and Lewis, Varzi (2007) also considers the relative benefits of treating
precisifications as precise languages rather than as ways of making a vague language precise. (He,
however, does not claim that we are speaking all of the precise languages simultaneously.)
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make progress on entrenched technical debates over the Liar paradox. Others
(Cappelen and Lepore, 2005) are driven to SAP by reflecting on the enormous
range of contents that ordinary speakers claim are being asserted by a typical
speech act.
With speech act pluralism in mind, our puzzle dissolves. Instead of presup-
posing that we are only speaking one language among a range of languages, we
should claim that we speak all of the languages delimited by our conventions of
language use.
More carefully: languages are taken to be precise in the spirit of early Lewis.
We can take languages to be set-theoretic objects that assign meanings to un-
interpreted sentence types. Languages come equipped with a grammar where a
grammar includes (:) a function from elementary lexical constituents to subsen-
tential meanings (e.g. Carnapian intensions), and (2) a set of combination op-
erations that build larger constituents from the elementary lexical constituents
and that assign meanings to the built constituents based on the meanings of the
elementary lexical constituents.
When I utter ‘Harry is bald’ I am simultaneously speaking many of these
precise languages. I take the foregoing claim to come with several commit-
ments. First: I am asserting many propositions simultaneously, each of which
has precise truth conditions (i.e. for each proposition asserted, that proposi-
tion is determinately true or determinately false). Second: each time I make a
particular utterance, I token many interpreted sentences – one for each precise
language that I speak. That last claim has two components. There is an onto-
logical component: I am postulating a plentitudinous ontology of interpreted
sentences. There is also a linguistic component: I am claiming that a single
5
utterance can token each of these interpreted sentences.6,7 In borderline cases,
one of the interpreted sentences that I utter s1 is true, and another s2 is false.
Correspondingly, one of the propositions that I assert is true, and one of the
propositions that I assert is false.
We now have a clear statement of the position. Admittedly, that position
may appear incredible. We now turn to the task of motivating and defending
the view. In order to do that, we must first examine the view’s rivals. In the
next several sections, I explore two rival forms of supervaluationism with which
I will compare supersententialism. Because the formal apparatus of supersen-
tentialism is similar to these rivals, in the process of describing the alternative
views, I will also give a model theory for supersententialism.
6In the course of discussing a problem with speech reports and semantic plasticity, Dorr
and Hawthorne (20:4, §5 (esp. pg. 333)) discuss a view of vagueness on which we are speaking
many precise languages simultaneously. Because the view is of limited help with the particular
problem they are investigating in their paper, it is not given a full development. In his (20:4,
§3.4 (esp. fn. :3)), Dorr voices his endorsement of a view on which we are speaking multiple
languages simultaneously – although the view is not ultimately developed or defended.
7The view described as ‘plurivaluationism’ in Smith (2008, §2.5) is most similar to the
present view. Without endorsing the view, he notes the Lewis/Burns contextualist treatment of
vagueness, and carves out a position in logical space on which there are multiple precisifications
that are ‘correct’ or ‘intended’. The discussion in this paper advances Smith’s in two ways. First:
it’s not clear whether Smith’s plurivaluationist is the same as supersententialism. Although his
plurivaluationist claims that “there is not a unique or correct interpretation", the plurivalua-
tionist stops short of explicitly embracing speech act pluralism. Although that seems to be a
natural consequence of the view, there is no discussion of this radical claim. And, Smith’s pluri-
valuationist explicitly disavows the claim that there is a notion of truth simpliciter that applies
to sentences. Instead, there is supposed to be only a notion of truth on this-or-that acceptable
interpretation as applied to uninterpreted sentences. Central to the supersententialist is the
claim that there are several interpreted sentences tokened in any speech act (hence the name of
the view), each of which is true or false simpliciter. This ontological and linguistic claim is what
allows her to (:) retain the highly intuitive idea of a sentence being true simpliciter (2) to treat
the T-schema as an instance of the Problem of the Many (see §9) and (3) to defend the view
from the criticisms of Williamson and Keefe (see §:0.2). Second: the present discussion offers a
motivation and defense for the view that is not contained in Smith’s discussion.
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2 The Supervaluationist Machinery
Supervaluationism is typically accompanied with a certain sort of formal ma-
chinery closely resembling that of quantified modal logic (QML) with classical
‘precisifications’ playing the analogous role of possible worlds. Consider a sim-
ple first-order language consisting of variables, names, predicates, connectives,
quantifiers, and the sentential operator Í (for ‘determinately’). The grammar
of the language is defined analogously with QML with Í in place of the ne-
cessity operator (). And as with QML (with a constant domain), a model is
a 3-tuple < P,D , I > consisting of a set of points (the ‘precisifications’) (P ), a
domain of objects (D ) and an interpretation function ( I ) which takes as input a
pair consisting of a word (names or predicates) and a precisification and has as
output the referent of that word according to that precisification (an object in
the case of a name or a set of n-tuples in the case of a n-place predicate).8 Vari-
able assignments assign variables in the language to objects. In order to define
a notion of truth simpliciter, we begin by defining notions of truth relative to
variable assignments, precisifications, and models.
Truth-at-a-precisification is defined analogously with the notion of truth-at-
a-world in QML. We first define truth-at-a-precisification-relative-to-a-variable-
assignment for atomic sentences in the natural way. Next we apply the standard
recursive definitions to define truth-at-a-precisification-relative-to-a-variable-as-
signment for complex sentences. Finally, we say that a sentence s is true-at-a-
precisification p if there is some variable assignment a such that s is true-at-p-
relative-to-a.
8For simplicity of exposition, I suppress the accessibility relation between precisifications.
We’ll assume a logic of S5, such that the necessity operator quantifies over all points in the
model. The model may be complicated to account for higher-order vagueness or when giving
a semantics for the classical rules of inference that respects global-validity. SeeWilliams (2008)
andWilliamson (:999).
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3 What is Standard Supervaluationism?
Above, we defined the notion of truth relative to a particular precisification in a
model. But we stopped short of defining truth in a model and truth simpliciter.
How should one define these notions of truth from the stipulated definitions
of truth-at-a-precisification? Supervaluationists define the technical notions of
supertruth (and superfalsity):
(Supertruth) s is supertrue (superfalse) on a modelM =< P,D , I > iff for all
precisifications p ∈ P , s is (not) true-at-p
Standard supervaluationism identifies truth (falsity) on a model with the defined
notion of supertruth (superfalsity) on that model:
(T=ST ) s is true (false) on a modelM iff s is supertrue (superfalse) onM .
And, as usual, truth (falsity) simpliciter is taken to be truth (falsity) on the
intended or correct model. What determines which model is the intended one
is a matter of substantial debate among meta-semanticists, a debate over which
the present account remains neutral.
(T=ST) allows the standard supervaluationist to give an account of many of
the features that distinguish borderline sentences. Most importantly, the thesis
allows the standard supervaluationist to explain the unassertibility of borderline
sentences. Suppose s is a sentence that is true on some but not all precisifications
of the intended model. For example, take s to be
(:) Bob is bald
where Bob is a borderline case of baldness. Given (T=ST ), (:) is not true. And,
given (T=ST ), the negation of (:) is not true. This result, combined with a
maxim to assert only truths
(Truth-Assertion) Assert s only if s is true
allows the supervaluationist to explain our hesitation in asserting either (:) or
its negation.
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4 Standard Supervaluationism and the Truth Ob-
jection
Standard supervaluationists’ adherence to (T=ST ), however, leads to the Truth
Objection – some instances of the T-schema are not assertible. From a border-
line sentence like (:), there are two paths to arriving at the unassertibility of an
instance of the T-schema.9
4.: Path One
Note that the law of excluded middle holds for the supervaluationist. In partic-
ular, the relevant instance
(2) Bob is bald or it’s not the case that Bob is bald
is supertrue. Now suppose for reductio that the supervaluationist accepts the
relevant instances of the disquotational schema:
(3) ‘Bob is bald’ is true iff Bob is bald.
(4) ‘It’s not the case that Bob is bald’ is true iff it’s not the case that Bob is
bald.
Then, substituting the left bijuncts from (3) and (4) into (2) we get:
(5) ‘Bob is bald’ is true or ‘It’s not the case that Bob is bald’ is true
By (T=ST), (5) is claiming that either a sentence or its negation is supertrue.
But we concluded above that neither (:) nor its negation is supertrue when
the sentence is true on some but not all precisifications of the intended model.
Short of giving up some classical rule of logic, supervaluationists are forced to
admit that some instances of the T-schema – like (3) and (4) – are not true and,
by (Truth-Assertion), are therefore not assertible.
9Williamson (:994b, :62) points out the first path and Keefe (2000, 2:4) points out the
second.
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4.2 Path Two
Consider again the relevant instance of the T-schema:
(3) ‘Bob is bald’ is true if and only if Bob is bald.
From (T=ST ) we learned that (:) is not true (because it’s true on some precisi-
fications and false on others):
(6) It’s not the case that ‘Bob is bald’ is true
Importantly, the claim made by (6) is not borderline – if it were borderline,
then it would not be true.:0 But of course, (6) is true. By (T=ST ) it’s supertrue,
which is to say it’s true on every precisification. Because (:) is not superfalse,
there is some precisification p∗ on which it is true. But then note that (3) is
false on p∗: it’s left bijunct is false (because it’s false on every precisification)
and it’s right bijunct is true on p∗. Supervaluationists are therefore forced to
admit that some instances of the T-schema – like (3) – are not true and, by
(Truth-Assertion), are therefore not assertible.
But plainly, the objection goes, all instances of the T-schema are true and
are assertible. Indeed, the T-schema features so centrally in our concept of truth
that its instances appear to be trivialities. To give up on the T-schema would be
to give up on a central feature of truth and raises the suspicion that standard su-
pervaluationists have changed the subject in their attempt to elucidate ordinary
truth.
5 Non-Standard Supervaluationism
Non-standard supervaluationists:: attempt to retain the original T-schema while
maintaining some of the core ideas of the standard supervaluationist framework.
:0Again: we’re setting aside higher-order vagueness here. With higher-order vagueness, the
point is simply that (6) does not adopt the first-order vagueness of (:).
::I have in mind here the view outlined in Field (:994).
:0
In particular, they agree with the standard supervaluationist on at least two
points related to the formal models. They accept that
(Core Idea :) Typical borderline sentences are not supertrue; there is some pre-
cisification p such that the sentence is not true-at-p.
(Core Idea 2) A sentence is assertible only if it’s supertrue.
Yet, non-standard supervaluationists wish to hold on to the view that all in-
stances of the T-schema are assertible. Therefore, non-standard supervaluation-
ists must accept the following: for any instance of the T-schema, that instance
is true on any precisification in the intended model. Recall our borderline sen-
tence (:) which is true on some but not all precisifications of the intended model
and the relevant instance of the T-schema (3). By stipulation, the right bijunct
of (3) is true on some but not all precisifications. For the biconditional to be
true on all precisifications, the left bijunct must be true on exactly those pre-
cisifications the right bijunct is true on – the sentence “Bob is bald’ is true’ is
borderline in the same way (:) is. As non-standard supervaluationists would put
it: attributions of truth must inherit the vagueness of the quoted sentence.
Non-standard supervaluationists agree with the standard supervaluationist
on Core Ideas : and 2. So over what do the non-standard supervaluationists
disagree with the standard supervaluationists? Core Ideas : and 2 give an account
of the unassertibility of borderline sentences in terms of the formal apparatus of
supervaluationism, but don’t connect that apparatus with notions of truth. It is
here that the standard supervaluationist and the non-standard supervaluationist
disagree: they give different accounts of the notions of truth in a model and,
more importantly, truth simpliciter.
There appear to be only two feasible options for an account of the notion
of truth-in-a-model.:2 Either a supervaluationists can take truth in a model to
be truth at all the precisifications, thereby accepting (T=ST ). Or they can take
:2There is third option: one could take truth to be truth at some privileged subset of precisifi-
cations (c.f. Williams (2008)); this version also succumbs to the truth objection.
::
truth in a model to be truth at a particular precisification. As explained above,
the first option leads to the unassertibility of the T-schema. The T-schema and
classical logic implies that a sentence or its negation is true. Together with
(T=ST ) we would get the result that every sentence is true on all precisifications
or false on all precisifications. But (with (Core Idea :)) that would rule out the
existence of borderline sentences.
Thus, the non-standard supervaluationist must pursue the second option
by modifying the definition of truth in the following way. Add to the model
another element so that models consist of a 4-tuple < P, c ,D , I > where c ∈
P . Intuitively, c is taken to be the ‘correct’ precisification. Then define truth
(falsity) in a model as truth (falsity) at c and truth (falsity) simpliciter as truth
(falsity) in the intended model. As a result, each sentence is either true or
false simpliciter – bivalence is preserved. The model theory, then, is exactly
analogous to the model theory of epistemicists or that of QML.
On this definition of truth, both paths to the Truth Objection are blocked.
With respect to the first path: because bivalence is preserved and each precisifi-
cation is classical, we get the result that either a sentence or its negation is true.
Thus (5) is no longer a problematic prediction of the view. With respect to the
second path: we can admit that (6) is borderline and not assertible.
Does the acceptance of bivalence amount to a denial of vagueness? No, for
it can be indeterminate which model is the intended one. So, while the notion
of truth-in-a-model is a precise notion, attributions of truth simpliciter can be
indeterminate.:3
:3Many non-standard supervaluationists – like the one represented in Field (:994) – are skep-
tical of the explanatory significance of the semantic notions formalized by the model. While I
think the model I present is the best way to supplement the non-standard supervaluationist view
with a formal model, I do not mean to commit myself to any claim as to the formal apparatus’
explanatory import.
:2
6 Non-Standard Supervaluationism and the Non-
Reductive Complaint
When non-standard supervaluationism is discussed in the literature, the view
that one typically has in mind is the one offered in Hartry Field’s early (:994)
work.:4 According to the non-standard supervaluationist, vagueness of the truth
attribution is explained by taking the truth predicate to be a vague one and
positing a penumbral connection between the vagueness in the truth predicate
and the vagueness in the quoted sentence. Allowing the predicate ‘is true’ to be
vague opens space for the necessary flexibility to allow for the posited penum-
bral connection, so that the truth of the left bijunct of the T-schema can vary
with the truth of the right bijunct, across all precisifications.
Considering non-standard supervaluationism,Williamson (:994b, :64) writes:
What then remains of supervaluationism? There remains the ‘definitely’ operator
with its semantics of admissible interpretation. However, this apparatus has lost
its privileged connection with the concept of truth. Of any admissible valuation,
we can ask whether it assigns truth to all and only the true sentences of the
language and falsity to all and only the false ones. At most one valuation has that
property. But then any other valuation will assign truth-values incorrectly, so
how can it be admissible? It might be replied that no interpretation is definitely
the one with the desirable property.
According to the non-standard supervaluationist there is one, and only one,
precisification in the intended model that assigns truth to all and only the true
sentences. Call that precisification the correct precisification. Truth simpliciter
is defined in terms of truth at this correct precisification. All other precisifica-
tions are incorrect, so their role is restricted to their role in giving the semantics
for the determinately operator (Í). And that role is consistent with the non-
:4How to interpret Field’s stance in his (:994) is not straightforward. While he outlines the
view I am discussing as a solution to the Truth Objection available to a deflationist about truth,
he stops short of endorsing it. As I read him, the view he ends up endorsing in that paper is
closer to the view of McGee and McLaughlin (:994) according to which the truth predicate
has two competing meanings. (However, he later gives up on supervaluationism altogether and
adopts three-valued logic with a sophisticated account of the conditional. See his Field (2003).)
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standard supervalationist’s definitions of truth. Recall that the correct precisi-
fication is not determinately correct – there are unintended models that are not
determinately unintended, according to which the alternative precisifications in
the intended model have the property of being the correct precisification. So,
it’s no wonder that the alternative not-determinately-incorrect precisifications
figure into the semantics for the determinately operator (Í).
It’s helpful to compare the point with the semantics given for modal lan-
guages. In the intended model for modal languages, there is one, and only
one, actual world and truth simpliciter is defined in terms of truth at the actual
world. All the other worlds in the intended model are non-actual so their role in
the semantics is restricted to their role in giving the semantics for the necessity
operator (). And that role is consistent with the modal logician’s definition
of truth simpliciter as truth at the actual world. There are unintended models
that could have been the intended models, according to which the other possible
worlds in the intended model have the property of being actualized. So, it’s no
wonder that other possible worlds figure into the semantics for the necessity
operator ().
Nevertheless, as Williamson (:994b; :994a) has taken pains to point out,
the view suffers from a less obvious (yet no-less-important) issue.:5 Continuing
from the above quote, Williamson (:994b, :64) writes:
It might be replied that no interpretation is definitely the one with the desirable
property. Once definiteness has been separated from truth, the reply is without
force. If an interpretation does have the desirable property, why should it matter
if it does not definitely have it? Indeed, the reply is in danger of losing its sense
as well as its force. If we cannot grasp the concept of definiteness by means of the
concept of truth, can we grasp it at all? No illuminating analysis of ‘definitely’
is in prospect. Even if we grasp the concept as primitive, why suppose it to be
philosophically significant?
Earlier, we suggested that the non-standard supervaluationist take the de-
terminately operator to quantify over the not-determinately-incorrect precisi-
fications. This however does not constitute an account of the determinately
:5A similar complaint can be found in Keefe (2000, 205-206)
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operator because it appeals to the notion of determinateness in explaining the
relevance of the incorrect precisifications in giving the semantics for the de-
terminately operator. We have a formal apparatus for understanding talk of
determinateness, and while that apparatus is illuminating in some ways, it does
little to illuminate the source of indeterminacy. The same point can be made in
the modal case. A possible-world semantics for modal talk, as enlightening as it
is, appeals to primitive modal notion and leaves the source of modality open to
interpretation.
One option is to take the notion as a primitive. This is the option pursued
in Field (:994) and Barnett (2009). Williamson’s objection to this strategy
seems to be that, if taken as primitive, an explanation must be given of why the
concept of determinateness plays its distinctive philosophical role. I take that
role to be primarily the role determinateness plays in our patterns of assertion:
if a sentence s is indeterminate, that sentence is unassertible.
An analogous criticism is inapplicable to the standard supervaluationist. Be-
cause they identify determinateness with the everyday notion of truth, their
story as to why determinateness plays the philosophical role it does goes via the
philosophical role that truth plays. For instance, we have a simple explanation
of the unassertibility of indeterminate sentences in terms of truth – namely that
we shouldn’t assert sentences that aren’t true (codified in Truth-Assertion above).
The challenge Williamson lodges on non-standard supervaluationists who
take the notion as primitive, however, is not obviously a fair one. In particu-
lar, for those of us that take concepts to be identified by their conceptual role,
Williamson’s complaint is impotent. Non-standard supervaluationists take a
concept as primitive and outline a conceptual role that this concept is meant
to play. That role is ‘philosophically significant’ in that it relates to concepts
like assertibility which philosophers tend to study. There is nothing more that
needs to be explained. Once both disputants acknowledge that a concept that
plays the specified role exists, and that the concept is primitive, there is no fur-
ther explanatory demand as to why that particular primitive concept plays that
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particular role. That’s not to say that positing primitive concepts is cost-free.
We have reason to prefer theories of our conceptual structure that appeal to
fewer primitive concepts.
But I think Williamson’s complaint obscures the more serious reason for be-
ing unsatisfied with the account of determinateness given by the non-standard
supervaluationist. Talk of concepts is a red herring. Consider a dispute be-
tween the epistemicist and a standard supervaluationist. That dispute is not –
or at least not only – about our concept of determinateness. Either party may
take the concept of determinateness to be conceptually primitive (however con-
ceptual primitiveness is best understood). The important question is the meta-
physical one: how do facts about indeterminacy reduce to more metaphysically
fundamental facts. The epistemicist has (the start of) a story: facts about inde-
terminacy are reduced to facts about knowability and facts about knowability
are reduced to facts including those about the plasticity of reference. And the
standard supervaluationist has (the start of) a story: the fundamental facts that
fix the facts about which interpretations are admissible fails to privilege a par-
ticular interpretation – a range of interpretations conform equally well with the
reduction base and have equal claim to being the intended interpretation.
Presumably the non-standard supervaluationist will not want to claim that
the determinately operator or facts involving the operator are metaphysically
fundamental, even if she admits its conceptual fundamentality. Taking the de-
terminately operator as metaphysically fundamental risks collapsing the view
to a highly implausible form of metaphysical indeterminacy.:6 But if the oper-
ator is not fundamental, then the account is incomplete: admitting conceptual
primitiveness does nothing to explain the operator’s reductive basis. That’s the
real reason to be unsatisfied with non-standard supervaluationism. They sim-
ply haven’t given us a complete account. Compare the analogous point in the
:6This is, for example, how Barnes and Williams (20::) understand their view: they take
the determinately operator or facts involving determinacy to be metaphysically fundamental.
They claim that this makes them invulnerable to Williamson’s complaint (which indicates that
they too view Williamson’s complaint as metaphysical, rather than conceptual, in nature).
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modal case. The dispute over various accounts of modality is over the meta-
physical reduction of modal facts (the linguistic ersatzer was never making a
claim of conceptual reduction!)
Let’s call this the Non-Reductive Complaint. The non-reductive complaint is
especially troubling once we recognize that epistemicism does give an account
of the source of indeterminacy in a way that is entirely consistent with the non-
standard supervaluationist position as elucidated so far. The epistemicist accepts
the same claims as the non-standard supervaluationist – perhaps even including
the conceptual primitiveness claim. For instance, they claim that there is a cor-
rect precisification in the intended model and that the other precisifications are
not determinately incorrect. But, the epistemicist can give a more complete ac-
count by filling in the details as to the metaphysical grounds of indeterminacy.:7
The appeal of epistemicism, then, is its ability to avoid both the Truth Objec-
tion and the Non-reductive Complaint. But, like the early contextualist solution
suggested by Lewis and Burns, the position rests on the incredible claim that the
non-semantic facts are rich enough to select a unique precisification as correct.
7 Supersententialism and the Non-Reductive Com-
plaint
The supersententialist, I’ll now argue, can resist the difficulty that Williamson
pointed out for attempts to develop non-standard supervaluationism. Let’s take
a moment to recall that difficulty. The non-standard supervaluationist’s woes
began at the final step of the specification of the model-theory for vague lan-
guages. She defined ‘truth-in-a-model’ from truth at the correct precisification,
and then took truth simpliciter to be truth in the intended model. Standard su-
pervaluationists defined truth-in-a-model in such a way that ruled out instances
of the T-schema as applied to borderline sentences. The non-standard superval-
uationist was able to make some progress on this front by adding a parameter to
:7This is howWilliamson (:994b) uses the complaint to motivate epistemicism.
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the models (c , the ‘correct’ precisification) and re-defining truth-in-a-model us-
ing that parameter. However her project ran into problems when she attempted
to define truth simpliciter as truth in the intended model. Because there is only
one such model, we lost our grip on the relevance of the (not determinately) un-
intended models corresponding with the other precisifications in the intended
model.
The appropriate point of resistance is located at the final step ofWilliamson’s
argument: there is no need to assume that there is only one intended model. If
the community speaks many languages simultaneously, there are several models
that are intended by a community: one for each of the languages that the com-
munity speaks. Each intended model will share the same set of precisifications
and for each precisification, there will be an intended model that selects that
precisification as correct.
The supersententialist is a non-standard supervaluationist – she denies that
truth in a model is supertruth. Unlike other non-standard supervaluationists,
however, she thinks that there are many intended models. She should therefore
adopt wholesale the formal apparatus of the non-standard supervaluationist,
in which a single model represents the semantic properties of a single one of
the many interpreted sentences uttered. We can take models to be the same
as those described above: models consist of a 4-tuple < P, c ,D , I > where c ∈
P . Intuitively, c is taken to be the ‘correct’ precisification and we define truth
(falsity) in a model as truth (falsity) at c .
If there are several intended models, related in the way described above, then
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it’s clear why, for any particular intended model, the other precisifications are
relevant. The other precisifications are relevant because there are other intended
models according to which these other precisifications are correct. More simply:
the other precisifications are relevant because we are also speaking languages on
which the truth is given by the other precisifications!
Most importantly, this account of determinacy explains the ‘philosophical
significance’ of the determinately operator. Consider the role that determinacy
plays in assertion. We don’t assert ðpñ when p is indeterminate. But that
follows from (Truth-Assertion). If p is indeterminate, then to utter ðpñ would
be to assert something false – at least one of the interpreted sentences we would
be asserting would be false, even if some other interpreted sentences are true.
Our goal in assertion is not only to speak the truth, but also to avoid speaking
falsehoods which explains why the determinately operator plays the role in does
in our practice of assertion.
The supersententialist, I’ve argued, does not succumb to Williamson’s criti-
cisms of non-standard supervaluationism. But have we lost sight of our original
goal? If supersententialism is to be preferred to standard supervaluationism, it
must avoid the Truth Objection In other words, supersententialists must ex-
plain the assertibility of all instances of the T-schema. In particular, they need
to explain the assertibility of claims like (3). If each utterance of the T-schema is
to be assertible, the uninterpreted sentence must be true on all of the intended
semantic models. Equivalently, it must be true on all of the precisifications of
some intended model. That is to say, it must true in all the languages being
simultaneously spoken.
This is no easy task for the supersententialist. Unlike the non-standard
supervaluationist, the supersententialist cannot appeal to the vagueness of the
truth predicate: any interpreted sentence is precisely true or precisely false. At
this point it may appear as though we’ve taken one step forward and several
steps backwards. The supersententialist doesn’t succumb to Williamson’s argu-
ments against non-standard supervaluationism. But it’s not clear that the view
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rebuts the Truth Objection. And what’s more, the view required us to adopt
the strange claim that we are simultaneously speaking many languages!
The key to developing the position is to examine a different debate – the
debate over the Problem of the Many – and apply the lessons from that debate
to our present dialectic.
8 The Lessons of the Many
Consider an ordinary cat, Tibbles, on a mat. Tibbles is shedding and some of
her hairs are in the process of falling off of her body. Consider one such hair, h.
For that hair h, it’s indeterminate whether it is part of Tibbles – it’s a borderline
part of Tibbles. Now consider the merelogical sum of Tibbles and h. Call that
object Tibbles+. Consider the merelogical difference of Tibbles and h. Call
that object Tibbles-.
Now consider the following claims:
(7) a. There is exactly one cat on the mat.
b. Tibbles is on the mat.
c. Tibbles is Tibbles+.
d. Tibbles is Tibbles-.
Both Tibbles+ and Tibbles- have equal claim to being a cat: there is no feature
of catiness that could distinguish between Tibbles+ and Tibbles-. Yet, the first
claim seems plainly true: there is only one cat on the mat. The second claim also
appears to be true. Together with the first claim, we get the result that there is
one and only one cat on the mat, and that cat is Tibbles. Yet, the last two claims
are unassertible: we hesitate to identify Tibbles with Tibbles+ or to identify her
with Tibbles-. This is one case of the infamous Problem of the Many: we must
explain the assertibility of the first two claims and the unassertibility of the
second two.
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One attempt to solve the problem posits a sort of dualism between Tib-
bles and the objects Tibbles+ and Tibbles-. On one development, there is a
metaphysically vague object that ‘Tibbles’ determinately refers to (van Inwa-
gen, :990; Tye, :996). On another development, Tibbles is not identical to any
material object, but is rather indeterminately constituted by one of the material
composites (Lowe, :995) or constituted by multiple material composites (Jones,
20:5).
Lewis (:993) claims, and I agree, that dualism is a solution of last resort.
This is the first lesson to draw from the Problem of the Many.
No Dualism Don’t posit a dualism between a ‘vague object’ and a ‘precise ob-
ject’; there are no vague objects.
Instead, Lewis advocates that a less costly solution locates the source of the
Problem in our language rather than in fundamental metaphysics, and proposes
two such solutions. On the first solution, Lewis takes the Problem to be a
case of vagueness, and applies the standard supervaluationist machinery to the
Problem. On this solution, the predicate ‘cat’ is vague; on one admissible pre-
cisification, Tibbles+ is in the extension of ‘cat’ and on another precisification
Tibbles- is in the extension of ‘cat’ (but in no precisification are both Tibbles+
and Tibbles- within the extension). In order for (7b) to come out as assertible,
the standard supervaluationist must also claim that the name ‘Tibbles’ is vague
while positing a penumbral connection between the name and the predicate
‘cat’ such that, for any precisification, the referent of ‘Tibbles’ according to that
precisification is in the extension of ‘cat’ according to that precisification. This
suggestion immediately predicts the desired pattern of assertibility for the four
claims above. Call this the Solution by Vagueness.
On Lewis’s second solution, Tibbles+ and Tibbles- are both cats. Yet, Lewis
claims that ordinary notions of counting are by ‘almost identity’ rather than
identity, where two objects are almost identical just in case they massively over-
lap. Call this the Solution by Plenitude. The solution by plenitude must also help
2:
itself to some of the resources of the Solution by Vagueness.:8 The solution by
plenitude admits that, strictly speaking, there are many cats on the mat. The
plenitudinous-philosopher, therefore, rejects the vagueness-philosopher’s insis-
tence that the predicate ‘cat’ is vague.:9 However, the plenitudinous philosopher
ought to continue to admit that the singular terms ‘Tibbles’ and ‘the cat on the
mat’ are vague. That explains our hesitation in asserting (7c) or (7d).
There has been an ongoing debate over which is the right solution to the
Problem of the Many. Lewis, for instance, claimed that both solutions are ad-
equate, and that each required elements of the other. I happen to think that
both solutions to the Problem of the Many are serious contenders.20 I there-
fore remain agnostic between the two solutions as solutions to the Problem of
the Many. However, the research underlying the Solution by Plenitude can be
fruitfully applied in a defense of supersententialism.
There are at least two lessons from the Solution by Plentitude worth distill-
ing.
Vague Singular Terms Our singular terms vaguely refer to one of the many
cats on the table.
Almost-Identity We count by almost-identity rather than strict identity.
9 The Problem of the Many Sentences
The supersententialist is facing an instance of the Problem of the Many, with
tokened sentences instead of cats. Drawing out this parallel, we can see that the
:8Lewis (:993) makes this point. He also argues that the Solution by Vagueness should help
itself to elements of the Solution by Plenitude, but that is not relevant for my argument here.
:9At least vague in the same way that the vagueness philosopher claims – the plenitudinous
philosopher might admit vagueness as to which plurality of cat-candidates count as the many
cats on the mat.
20SeeWilliams (2006) for one powerful argument in favor of the Solution by Plentitude. See
Weatherson (2003) for an excellent defense of the Solution by Vagueness.
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supersententialist has the tools to rebut the Truth Objection. The supersenten-
tialist claims that we speak several languages, one for each of the precisifications
in the supervaluationist model. When I make a particular utterance, I am in fact
uttering many sentences. When I make a borderline utterance of “Bob is bald”, I
am producing several interpreted sentences, each with precise truth conditions.
Some of these sentences are true; some of these sentences are false. Because we
refrain from asserting falsehoods, and we cannot assert the true sentences with-
out also asserting the false sentences, we hesitate to utter any of the sentences.
Thus truth under all of the precisifications – or truth under all of the languages
– is a necessary condition for assertibility.
Consider once more (3):
(3) ‘Bob is bald’ is true iff Bob is bald.
If our theory is to avoid the Truth Objection, we must show how (3) is true
on all of the precisifications (equivalently: true on all of the languages being
spoken). The right-hand side of the biconditional is true on some precisifica-
tion and false at others; our challenge is to explain how the left-hand side of the
biconditional is true at exactly those precisifications. The non-standard super-
valuationist solved her analogous problem by taking the truth predicate to be
vague in the same way as the quoted sentences. But, we noted, the supersenten-
tialist cannot make the parallel move. Because each of the sentences have precise
truth conditions, the truth predicate (as applied to these interpreted sentences)
cannot be vague.
By positing a plenitude of sentences being uttered in a single utterance, how-
ever, the supersententialist can apply the lesson Vague Singular Terms from
the Problem of the Many. Although there is no room to posit vagueness in
the predicate, we can posit vagueness in the singular term – the sentence be-
ing named by the quotation marks.2: The supersententialist can also posit a
2:Compare the move made at the end of Weatherson (2003) in which Weatherson takes
the name of a predicate to be vague in order to rebut an argument by Merricks (200:) for
metaphysical indeterminacy.
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penumbral connection between the quotation name “Bob is bald” and the right
bijunct ‘Bob is bald’ such that the sentence named under a precisification is true
just in case ‘Bob is bald’ is true on that precisification. In less standard but more
perspicuous terms: for any language L being spoken, the interpreted sentence
being named in L by the quotation in an utterance of (3) has the same truth
conditions as the sentence ‘Bob is bald’ as interpreted by L.22
This move is available to the supersententialist because she posits several lan-
guages being spoken simultaneously. Without a plenitudinous ontology of in-
terpreted sentences, there is no plenitude of candidates for which the quotation-
name can vaguely refer to. Such a plenitude is vital to opening up the possibility
of positing vagueness in the singular term. The failure to appreciate this signifi-
cant advantage is perhaps what has led many supervaluationists to be dismissive
of proposals similar to supersententialism. For example, Keefe (2000, :998)
accuses a proposal akin to supersententialism as collapsing into standard super-
valuationism or mere notational variants of the view.23 I agree that supersen-
tentialism has certain structural and formal parallels with supervaluationism –
namely it endorses (Core Idea :) and (Core Idea 2) – which is why I see the view
as a form of supervaluationism. But by claiming that we speak many precise
languages, the view posits a plentitudinous ontology of sentences that are ut-
tered together. Once this advantage is appreciated, however, the suggested way
around the truth objection becomes obvious. And, the supersentential devel-
opment of non-standard supervaluationism, unlike other developments, is not
susceptible to the non-reductive complaint as we established in §7.
22Note that the same sort of solution can be applied to a propositional disquotational scheme
– it’s true that p iff p – according to which the that- clause is a vague singular term between
various propositions with precise truth-conditions.
23Keefe directs her attack against Burns (:99:) as interpreted as a supersententialist. However,
Burns’ actual theory differs from supersententialism, as explained above (§:.:).
24
:0 Objections Considered
In this section, I reply to various objections to the view outlined above. One
theme running throughout these replies is an application of research done on
the Problem of the Many in service of rebutting the present objections.
:0.: We Speak One Language
Objection. According to you, I am speaking many languages at once. As much
as I might wish that I were multilingual, I am not. I speak one and only one
language: English! Yet according to the supersententialist, I am in fact speaking
many languages.
Reply. Recall our lesson Almost-Identity from Lewis’s Solution by Plen-
itude to the Problem of the Many. Lewis accepts that there are in fact many
cats on the mat but claims that we count only one cat on the mat because
we count by almost-identity rather than strict identity, where two objects are
almost-identical if they massively overlap. Together with the claim that the
name ‘Tibbles’ indeterminately refers to one of the many cats, we predict the
relevant data.
The supersententialist can make use of the same strategy. According to the
supersententialist, there are in fact many languages that we speak, but we count
only one language because we count languages by almost*-identity, where two
languages are almost*-identical when the intensions for the terms massively
overlap.24 Together with the claim that the name ‘English’ indeterminately
refers to one of the many languages, we predict the relevant data. (Speaking
loosely) we do speak one and only one language: English! The same solution
can be extended from number of languages spoken to number of sentences ut-
24Of course the relevant notion of overlap used to define almost*-identity is not the mere-
ological notion Lewis used to define almost-identity, but I take it that the notion is obvious
enough. For example, take intensions to be functions ( i ) from worlds (w ) to sets of objects and
consider a suitable measure m. Two intentions i1 and i2 massively overlap if for all w in the
domain of both i1 and i2, m(i1(w)∩ i2(w)) is very close to m(i1(w)) and very close to m(i2(w)).
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tered, in the obvious way, to generate the result that I assert exactly one sen-
tence.
Indeed, I think there is a good case to be made, independently of our discus-
sion of vagueness, that we already have a grip on the notion of almost*-identity
and count languages by something like almost*-identity. Compare the language
spoken in the US according to which ‘torch’ means something that produces
fire with the language spoken in England according to which ‘torch’ means
flashlight.25 By Leibniz’s law, these languages are not strictly identical. Yet no
American-English speaker claims to be bilingual as a result of speaking British-
English.
:0.2 What About the Unsharp Sentence?
Objection. You’ve shown that the T-schema holds for each of the precise lan-
guages that we speak. But that doesn’t solve the original problem. We were
supposed to show that the T-schema holds for the imprecise sentence, not merely
the precise sentences! Williamson (:994a) puts the objection best when he con-
siders a proposal similar to supersentialism:
The utterance ‘a is a heap’ is by ordinary standards the utterance of a single sen-
tence. If it is held that in reality many sentences were uttered, a special way
of individuating sentences must be in play....Call the many nonstandardly in-
dividuated co-uttered sentences sharpened, and the original standardly individ-
uated sentence unsharpened. Once can still ask for the truth-value of the un-
sharpened sentence....the disquotational principle must fail for unsharpened sen-
tences...According to the original intuition, if a is a heap then the unsharpened ‘a
is a heap’ is true...(:80)
Reply. My opponent, and Williamson, appear to have a different view in
mind than the view I am endorsing. According to my view, there is no such thing
as the ‘unsharpened sentence’. There are only a plurality of sharp sentences.
That follows from the lessonNoDualism from the Problem of theMany: don’t
adopt dualism unnecessarily. To posit an additional object – the ‘unsharpened
25Thanks to Chip Sebens for this helpful example.
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sentence’ – over and above the many sharpened sentences is to adopt a sort of
‘dualism’ about sentences that is no part of my theory. Just as I don’t posit an
unsharp cat over and above the many sharp cats when solving the Problem of
the Many, I do not posit an unsharp sentence over and above the many sharp
sentences when solving the Problem of Vagueness.
Williamson appears to have assumed that only a dualism between unsharp
and sharp sentences can accommodate our original intuition behind the T-
schema, which appears not to be directed towards these precise sentences. But
again, the analogy with the Problem of theMany is useful here. If there is a sense
in which the original intuition behind predications of the truth predicate didn’t
apply to sharp sentences but rather to an unsharp sentence, then it’s the same
sense in which our original intuition behind predications of the cat predicate
didn’t apply to sharp cat-candidates but rather an unsharp cat. I’ve successfully
accounted for both the unsharp-cat intuition and the unsharp-sentence intuition
by positing vagueness in the relevant singular terms.
Objection (cont’d). But consider the sentence that has the truth-conditions
as posited by the standard-supervaluationist, complete with truth-gaps. Deny-
ing the existence of such an unsharpened sentence is unmotivated. Here’s an
argument from Keefe (2000) given when considering a proposal similar to su-
persententialism according to which there are no unsharp sentences:26
[The supersententialist might insist] that talk of ‘the vague language’ is not ac-
ceptable...[but she] has has no grounds on which to maintain this insistence. For
she adopts Lewis’s account of the role of beliefs and intentions in fixing the lan-
guage spoken and hence the meanings of sentences, and if we are seeking to be
truthful and trusting in the whole cluster of languages then our beliefs and in-
tentions are related in exactly the appropriate way to the corresponding language
whose truth-conditions are given by the [standard] supervaluationist account.
(:44)
There is some object that is very much like a Lewisian language in that it is
a function from words to intension-like things. For instance, this object is
26Keefe misattributes the view to Burns (:99:). As I pointed out above, Burns actual view is
that we speak one of the many languages delimited by our conventions. See §:.:.
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a function from words to functions from worlds to pairs of extensions and
anti-extensions. This object plays all of the theoretical roles of a language. In
particular, we obey a convention of truthfulness and trust with respect to this
language-like object. So this object must qualify as a language! But then we
are back to Williamson’s earlier complaint: the T-schema does not apply to the
sentence uttered in this unsharp language.27
Reply. Suppose we decide to call such an object a language. Why think that
we speak such a language? If we did speak such a language, we wouldn’t assert
the T-schema. We don’t speak a language on which ‘cat’ means table, because
we don’t apply the predicate ‘cat’ to tables. Similarly, we don’t speak a language
on which truth is super-truth, because we make utterances like (3).
Objection (cont’d). But plainly there is something that is an ‘unsharpened sen-
tence’. Consider the individual’s utterance as distinct from the many sentences
uttered. The T-schema fails for utterances. Or, consider the uninterpreted sen-
tence uttered. The T-schema fails for uninterpreted sentences (u-sentences).
Reply :. It’s not clear that utterances are bearers of truth. Note the awk-
wardness of predicating truth to utterances when we are explicit about referring
to the utterance rather than the sentence28:
(8) # That speech act was true.
(9) # What he did in asserting that sentence was true.
There is even less reason to treat uninterpreted sentences as bearers of truth
– at least as bearers of truth simpliciter, which I take to be what is predicated in
instances of the T-schema. The sentence is supposed to be uninterpreted, so it
doesn’t have a meaning – it lacks intentionality. But such meaningless objects
plainly cannot be true simpliciter. This is especially apparent when we notice
that the same uninterpreted sentence can correspond to a true interpreted sen-
tence and a false interpreted sentence. Again, ordinary folk talk of truth can
27Thanks to Daniel Drucker for discussion here.
28This example is fromMacFarlane (20:4, §3.:.2)
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be interpreted as being predicated of interpreted sentences rather than uninter-
preted sentences.
Reply 2. Suppose we do decide to posit utterances and uninterpreted sen-
tences as linguistic entities that are truth-apt. On this supposition, our practice
of quotation-naming is ambiguous between naming utterances, unintepreted
sentences or interpreted sentences. I’ve shown that the T-schema holds for the
interpreted-sentences and thus for one disambiguation of the truth predicate
and quotation-name. That is sufficient to explain the assertibility of instances
of the T-schema.
:0.3 Did She Really Say That?
Objection. Mary observes Hsiao making the following utterance:
(:0) Harry is bald.
According to your view, when Hsiao utters ‘Harry is bald’ she tokens many
non-identical (counting by strict identity) sentences, each with precise truth
conditions. And thus Hsiao asserts many propositions when she utters ‘Harry
is bald’. For example, she asserts that Harry has less than :0,000 hairs on his
head (assuming this is one precisification of ‘bald’). But Mary cannot say:
(::) # Hsiao said that Harry has less than :0,000 hairs on his head.
There are two replies to this objection. The first is motivated by pragmatic
considerations. The second follows the theme of the rest of the paper by re-
flecting on lessons from Lewis’s solution to the Problem of Many. A warning
before proceeding: theorizing about speech reports is a messy business. Indeed,
the messiness has led some (Cappelen and Lepore, 2005) to give up on sim-
ple, systematic theories of speech reports. My response, therefore, is sometimes
forced to mirror some of this messiness.
Reply :. We can accept the truth of this claim, while explaining the awkward-
ness of the speech report pragmatically. Consider scalar implicatures. Imagine a
scenario in which I’ve seen exactly how many chairs are in the room. If I utter:
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(:2) There are 3 chairs in the room.
I implicate that there are exactly 3 chairs in the room. For otherwise, if there
were exactly 5 chairs in the room, I would have make the strictly stronger asser-
tion:
(:3) There are 5 chairs in the room.
That follows from the Gricean maxim of maximal informativeness. Note just
how strong the implicature is. Indeed, the implicature is so strong, meta-
linguistic negation is warranted. If my friend walks into the room and observes
exactly 4 chairs, it seems appropriate for him to utter:
(:4) There aren’t 3 chairs in the room – there are four.
In the case of Hsiao’s assertion, the maxim of maximal informativeness is also
violated. If Mary had uttered:
(:5) Hsiao said that Harry is bald.
she would have asserted strictly more propositions. The fact that she chose
to perform the less-informative speech act implicates that Hsiao didn’t say that
Harry is bald. This explains the awkwardness of asserting (::). And as with the
chair example, the implicature may be strong enough to warrant meta-linguistic
negation.
Indeed, if this pragmatic explanation of the unassertibility of (::) were true,
we would expect the unassertibility of (::) to wane as the conversational pur-
pose of the assertion (or the ‘question under discussion’) is made specific to a
particular precise propositions, so that there is less reason to be maximally in-
formative. And this prediction seems to be satisfied. For instance, suppose that
we’re in a context in which the term ‘tall’ definitely applies to a child if she is
taller than 5’0" and definitely doesn’t apply if the child is shorter than 4’7". (So,
if a child is between 4’7" and 5’0", it is indeterminate whether she is tall, and
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(by Core Idea 2) inappropriate to assert that she is tall.) A parent is planning a
trip to an amusement park for which, let’s say, one cannot enter unless they are
at least 4’9". Arvind, speaking to the parent says:
(:6) Regina is tall.
When asked whether Regina will be tall enough to ride the rides, the parent
reports:
(:7) Don’t worry: Arvind said that Regina is taller than 4’9".
(:7) strikes me as perfectly assertable. It is certainly much less awkward
than if the conversational purpose of the assertion weren’t so specific, which
is exactly what the pragmatic story would predict. (Because vague words tend
to be highly context sensitive, when imagining the scenario, it’s important to
keep at the forefront that the context picks out the range of meanings for ‘tall’
as specified above.) Indeed, the parent could follow up the report by canceling
the implicature:
(:8) I don’t mean to say that’s all Arvind said. He said more than just that: he
said that she is tall.
Reply 2. My second reply continues the theme of drawing lessons from the
Solution by Plentitude from the Problem of the Many, and explains our reluc-
tance to accept claims like (::) using a psychological theory of counting. Recall
the lesson Almost-Identity: when we say ‘there is exactly one cat on the mat’,
we are counting by almost-identity rather than strict identity. Counting by
almost-identity comes with a linguistic dimension and a psychological dimen-
sion.
According to the linguistic dimension, my utterance
(:9) There is exactly one cat on the mat.
can be adequately paraphrased as (something like)
3:
(20) Every cat on the mat massively overlaps each other.
either because (:9) is true in virtue of expressing a proposition with the truth-
conditions of (20), or (:9) is strictly speaking false but the availability of the
nearby proposition expressed by (20) blunts the incredulity of the falsehood.
There is also a psychological dimension to counting by almost-identity.
Plainly, when we look at Tibbles on a mat, we are not simultaneously repre-
senting the many cats on the mat. Rather, we are only representing a single
cat on the mat and are ignoring the distinctions between the many cats. That’s
why, when the differences between the many cats become relevant, we are ini-
tially struck with puzzlement. When the differences between the cats are made
salient, we form a more fine-grained representation of the situation. Represent-
ing the situation fine-grainly, we realize that we’ve been ignoring the many cats,
and have been counting by almost-identity all along, despite thinking that we
were counting by strict identity. And, that fine-grained representation is short-
lived – outside of philosophical contexts, we switch back to the coarse-grained
representation of a single cat on the mat.
Now consider how this psychological story applies to the supersententialist.
When Mary says “Hsiao said that Harry has less than :0,000 hairs on his head"
it naturally strikes us as very odd. That’s because we’ve been operating under a
coarse-grained representation of the many propositions expressed, treating them
as one. Because we’ve been representing all of these propositions as one, when
the difference between the propositions are made salient by Mary’s utterance,
we are struck with puzzlement. It’s only after philosophical reflection that we
realize that we’ve been counting them by almost-identity all along.
:0.4 Higher Order Vagueness
Objection. You’ve presented your view while ignoring higher-order vagueness.
But the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness is real, and your view is incom-
patible with it. According to your view, when I make an utterance, I am in fact
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uttering many sentences in many languages. And, an assertion is permissible
just in case it expresses only true sentences. A borderline sentence is one that is
simultaneously uttered with other sentences of differing truth values. But then
consider the set of sentences S which are expressed by a given assertion. Either
(:) each of the sentences are true, (2) each of the sentences are false, or (3) some
are true and some are false. In the first and second cases, the sentence is not bor-
derline. In the third case, the sentence is borderline. But then there is no room
for higher-order vagueness: no scenario corresponds with borderline borderline
sentences.
Reply. I will not attempt to directly show how my account can give an
adequate account of higher-order vagueness. I’ve been arguing that supersenten-
tialism is the best form of supervaluationism. So, I will be content to show that
higher-order vagueness poses no unique problem for my account, as compared
to the standard supervaluationist. There is parallel complaint that can be lev-
eled against the standard supervaluationist, and the same replies she gives to her
analogous objection is available to me.
Compare the complaint above with the following analogous complaint di-
rected against the standard supervaluationist:
Consider a sentence s and the set of admissible precisifications. Either (:) s is true
on each of the admissible precisifications, (2) s is false on each of the admissible
precisifications, or (3) s is true on some precisifications but false on other precisi-
fications. In the first and second cases, the sentence is not borderline. In the third
case, the sentence is borderline. But there is no room for higher-order vagueness:
no scenario corresponds with borderline borderline sentences.
The standard supervaluationist has two responses. The first is to deny the phe-
nomenon of higher-order vagueness; the supersententialist can, of course, also
deny higher-order vagueness. The second response is to argue that the meta-
language term ‘admissible precisifications’ is itself indeterminate.29 Although
there is one and exactly one set of admissible precisifications, it’s indeterminate
which set that is. In other words, which standard supervaluationist model is
29See Keefe (2000, §8) for this response.
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the intended one is indeterminate. Thus, the standard supervaluationist can ex-
plain cases of borderline borderline sentences as cases in which the sentence is
borderline on one modelM1 and not borderline inM2, whereM2 andM1 are
not determinately not the intended model. A parallel reply is open to the super-
sententialist. The supersententialist claims that the theorist’s term “languages
being spoken” is itself indeterminate. Although there is one and exactly one set
of languages being spoken, it’s indeterminate which set that is. In other words,
which set of supervaluationist models are the intended set is indeterminate.
:: Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to defend supersententialism as the most plausible
form of supervaluationism. My strategy was to treat the Problem of Vague-
ness as an instance of the Problem of the Many and draw on the Solution by
Plentitude for the Problem of the Many.
Let’s take a moment to compare the advantages of supersententialism with
rival forms of supervaluationism. The supersententialists’ main advantage over
the standard supervaluationist is that they retain the assertibility of all instance
of the T-schema. According to the standard supervaluationist, some instances
of the T-schema are untrue and therefore unassertible.30 The supersentential-
ist’s main advantage over rival forms of non-standard supervaluationist is that
30There are several other advantages that the supersententialist, as a non-standard supervalu-
ationist, has over the standard supervaluationist. First: it solves a puzzle for speech reports de-
scribed by Schiffer (:998). (Although, seeWeatherson (2003) for a solution on behalf of the
standard supervaluationist.) Second: because truth isn’t supertruth, local validity is the correct
understanding of truth-preservation and the classical rules of inference are preserved. Because
the standard supervaluationist must treat truth-preservation as global validity, they lose several
classical rules of inference. (C.f. Varzi (2007); although seeWilliams (2008) for a solution on
behalf of the standard supervaluationist.) Third: non-standard supervaluationists have a natural
response to the objection to supervaluationism offered by Fodor and Lepore (:996) according
to which the precise precisifications of a vague language are simply irrelevant to discovering the
meaning of the original vague language. The objection doesn’t touch the non-standard super-
valuationists like the supersententialist, because they deny that there is a vague language distinct
from the precise languages (c.f. Varzi (2007)).
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it avoids the non-reductive objection. The supersententialist gives a fully re-
ductive explanation of determinateness and vagueness which neatly explains the
philosophical significance the notions have for our patterns of assertion.
Supersententialism, no doubt, makes some seemingly incredible claims. But
all theories of vagueness make some seemingly incredible claims. Drawing on
the Problem of the Many, I hope to have shown that these claims are not as
incredible as they may have seemed. And, with these claims, I hope to have
offered the most promising form of supervaluationism.
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Chapter 2
Vague Naturalness as Ersatz
Metaphysical Vagueness†
There is a certain argument schema that is popular in contemporary meta-
physics. It focuses on some term t and argues that the following claims are
inconsistent:
(V:) t is vague
(V2) The property picked out by t is perfectly natural
(V3) There is no metaphysical vagueness
Call the above schema the Generalized Vagueness Argument Schema (GVAS).
The GVAS is applied to different types of properties and to different dialecti-
cal ends. Authors including Dougherty (20:3), Dorr and Hawthorne (20:4),
Sider (2009b; 20::), Williams (2008a), and, arguably, Barnes (20:4) and Parfit
(:984) apply the schema in debates over ethical properties, personal identity,
†Thanks to Daniel Drucker, David Manley, Eric Swanson, JRG Williams, and two anony-
mous referees. Thanks also to audiences at Michigan for helpful questions. Special thanks to
Ted Sider for several early meetings and comments on this essay, and Brian Weatherson for
extensive feedback throughout the development of this essay.
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consciousness, special science properties, unrestricted mereological composi-
tion, four dimensionalism, ontological realism, and beyond.: Sometimes the
schema is used to argue that there is metaphysical vagueness (from (V:) and
(V2)). Other times, it’s deployed in order to establish that a property can’t be
perfectly natural (from (V:) and (V3)) or that a term isn’t vague (from (V2) and
(V3)). And sometimes it’s used in a reductio against a position that is suppos-
edly committed to all three theses.
The GVAS, if it works, ends up having significant upshots for our theoriz-
ing. That’s because often each of the three theses (V:)-(V3) looks fairly com-
pelling. In the case of ethical properties, for example, we might have good rea-
son to acknowledge that our moral terms are vague (V:) while adopting robust
moral realism, understood in terms of perfect naturalness (V2) – all without
having to accept spooky metaphysical vagueness (V3).
The prevalence of the GVAS has not been fully appreciated. That’s partly
because authors present the GVAS with varying degrees of explication. On its
more explicit presentations, proponents of the GVAS gesture at the role per-
fect naturalness plays in resolving semantic indeterminacy – a meta-semantic
program that has come to be known as reference magnetism. Often, however,
the details of the argument from reference magnetism to the GVAS are kept
implicit.
The first task of this paper is to document the prevalence of the GVAS and
offer a detailed presentation of the reference magnetic argument for the incom-
patibility of (V:)-(V3). This presentation alone is significant. It unifies a set
of seemingly disparate arguments under one hidden schema and develops the
strongest version of that schema, which can then be extended to instances where
exposition is lacking. With a clear presentation in hand, we are also well posi-
tioned to chart out the various possible strategies for resisting the GVAS.
The second task of this paper is to develop one such strategy that I find par-
:Neither Parfit nor Barnes make explicit appeal to Lewisian naturalness but rather to funda-
mentality and irreducibility. As I discuss, their arguments are incomplete; understanding them
as instances of the GVAS allows us to complete them.
40
ticularly fruitful. I propose that those attracted to (V:)-(V3) adopt a position
that I call ersatz metaphysical vagueness. According to the ersatzer, the term ‘per-
fectly natural’ is vague and the vagueness is not metaphysical. I’ll argue that
adopting ersatz metaphysical vagueness allows us to mimic genuine metaphysi-
cal indeterminacy, giving us a highly general strategy for resisting GVAS argu-
ments. By taking the term ‘perfectly natural’ in (V2) to be non-metaphysically
vague, (V:)-(V3) can be made consistent. Importantly, we can continue to treat
the vague term as picking out a perfectly natural, reference magnetic property.
This will be a welcome result for those who are attracted to (V:)-(V3) in
a given domain. Moreover, because GVAS arguments that go from (V:) and
(V2) to the negation of (V3) are a popular way to motivate metaphysical vague-
ness, ersatz metaphysical vagueness gives us a non-objectionable alternative to
genuine metaphysical vagueness.2
: The GVAS
The GVAS wouldn’t be of much dialectical interest if there were little initial
plausibility to one or other of (V:)-(V3). But, for a range of properties, each
of the theses do have some independent plausibility – none are obviously false.
Thus, the GVAS, if successful, would have substantial theoretical upshots.
Consider (V3), the claim that there is no metaphysical vagueness. Meta-
physical indeterminacy is often stated as the view that the “world itself, inde-
pendently of what we know about it or how we represent it, is metaphysically
indeterminate” (Williams, 2008b, :). Giving a theory of metaphysical vague-
ness – a theory of how the ‘world itself’ can be vague – is notoriously chal-
lenging. Fortunately, for our purposes, we need not dive into the nature of
2Throughout the paper, I will be a bit sloppy in my use of the terms ‘indeterminate’ and
‘vague’, treating them as synonymous. Strictly speaking, vagueness might require more than in-
determinacy. However, the GVAS seeks to show that terms that pick out perfectly natural prop-
erties cannot be non-metaphysically indeterminate (and therefore cannot be non-metaphysically
vague). So the focus of the paper, in the first instance, is indeterminacy not vagueness.
4:
metaphysical vagueness. Following Barnes (20:0), it suffices to offer a negative
characterization of metaphysical vagueness according to which some sentence
is indeterminate and the source of the indeterminacy is neither semantic nor
epistemic. More carefully3:
MV A sentence S is metaphysically vague iff, were all its representational con-
tent precisified, there is an admissible precisification of S such that accord-
ing to that precisification the sentence would still be non-epistemically
indeterminate.4
How should we assess the plausibility of a metaphysically vague sentence
(as defined by (MV))? Some have complained that metaphysical vagueness is
incoherent or unintelligible.5 Coherence and intelligibility aside, I can think of
at least two reasons for doubting the claim that there is metaphysical indeter-
minacy. The first reason: the view strikes many (myself included) as incredi-
ble. Although this may be good reason to reject metaphysical indeterminacy,
incredulity arguments are, of course, of limited persuasiveness. The second rea-
son: metaphysical indeterminacy requires positing irreducible ideology that is
objectionable. The specifics of this worry, of course, depend on the particular
theory of metaphysical vagueness under examination. But the most plausible
developments do seem to succumb to this objection. For instance, according to
the development in Barnes and Williams (20::), indeterminacy is taken as an
irreducible piece of ideology: there are irreducible facts that involve the inde-
terminacy operator. And the indeterminacy operator just seems like the wrong
sort of irreducible ideology. Just as many balk at the idea that the world is ir-
reducibly modal, there is something deeply off-putting about the idea that the
world is irreducibly indeterminate.
3In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I argue that (MV) is a flawed extension of the exclusion test
for metaphysical vagueness. Because offering an analysis of metaphysical vagueness would take
me far afield from the goals of this paper, I set aside those complaints here and treat (MV) as a
proxy for metaphysical vagueness. (Note that the exclusion test suffices to establish premise (v)
of the argument below.)
4C.f. Barnes (20:0, 604)
5See Barnes and Williams (20::) andWilson (20:3) for a reply.
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Of course, the literature on metaphysical vagueness is large and camps are
entrenched – no doubt some find metaphysical vagueness neither incredible nor
objectionable. But even fans of metaphysical vagueness should admit that the
position isn’t obviously true and thus have reason to be interested in the suc-
cess of the GVAS. Moreover, (V3) can be refined to claim that the particular
terms targeted by the GVAS (e.g. ‘wrong’, ‘person’, ‘conscious’, etc.) are not
metaphysically vague. Anyone who doesn’t take this more specific claim to be
obvious should take an interest in the GVAS.
The reasons to prefer (V2) vary from dialectic to dialectic. But the sorts of
properties that the GVAS is typically directed against include normative proper-
ties, consciousness, special science properties, personal identity, and existence.
And while there is no general argument that purports to establish the perfect
naturalness of all of these properties, many theorists have found domain-specific
reason to accept (V2). For instance, Dougherty (20:3) and Schoenfield (20:6)
are sympathetic to moral realism, which they understand as the claim that moral
properties are “part of the deep metaphysical structure of the world," where this
is glossed in terms of Lewisian naturalness. Zimmerman (20:0) understands du-
alist positions in the philosophy of mind in terms of perfectly natural qualia
properties. Sider (200:b, 2009a,b, 20::) finds good reason to accept ontolog-
ical realism, which he understands as the claim that the quantifier is perfectly
natural (or in his terminology ‘structural’). Eklund (2004, 492) considers the
thesis that being a person is a natural property. And Williams (2008a) under-
stands ‘metaphysically primitive’ special science properties in terms of perfect
naturalness.
Turn now to (V:): the claim that the terms for these properties are vague.
There are two main avenues for generating the plausibility of (V:) for predicates
like ‘is permissible’, ‘is a person’, ‘is conscious’, etc.
The first avenue is loosely inspired by the vagueness argument for compo-
sition given in Lewis (:986, 2:2). Call the property that is supposed to be the
referent of the term t in the schema the target property. So, if the term targeted
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by the GVAS is ‘is a person’, then the target property is personhood. We’ll say
that the property named by t is vague just in case there is some object such
that it is indeterminate whether that object instantiates the property named by
t . So, we’ll say that personhood is vague just in case there is some object such
that it’s vague whether that object instantiates personhood. Crucially, person-
hood may be vague without the vagueness being metaphysical. For all I’ve said,
the indeterminacy might be entirely semantic; it may be that we haven’t settled
which precise property is being picked out by the term ‘personhood’.
For each target property, there is supposed to be some intuitive desideratum
for the property’s instantiation, such that the target property is instantiated iff
some base property is instantiated. It’s then noted that any reasonable way of
spelling out the base property will be vague: there will be cases in which it is
indeterminate whether the base property is satisfied. A more precise specifica-
tion of the base property is supposed to be absurd. There is thus pressure to
conclude that the target property is indeterminate (V:).6 Examples of target
properties and their corresponding base properties include:7
• Mereological composition and life, consciousness, sufficient stuck-togeth-
erness, etc.
6We can firm up the argument a bit by considering its form: {φ↔ψ,Ï(φ)} `Ï(ψ) where
‘Ï(φ)’ stands for ‘indeterminately φ’ or equivalently (¬ Í (φ)) ∧ (¬ Í (¬φ)) where Í (φ)
stands for ‘determinately φ’. The formulas φ and ψ will assert the existence of an instance of
the base property and target property respectively. Thus, they will be of the form: ∃xF x. The
conclusion of the argument will be Ï(∃xF x) where F is the target property. Assuming that
the quantifier is not vague, the vagueness looks to be in the target term F . In other words:
Ï(∃xF x) ` ∃xÏ(F x). Focusing on supervaluationism and epistemicism, the question as to
whether or not the inference {φ↔ ψ,Ï(φ)} ` Ï(ψ) is valid will depend on whether or not
the correct logic of vagueness validates p `Í (p). On simple supervaluationist models, of the
kinds discussed byWilliamson (:994), this inference holds. However, this inference also forces
the supervaluationist to give up some classical rules of inference (contraposition, conditional
proof, argument by cases, and reductio ad absurdum). Theories for which p 0Í (p), including
epistemicism and more sophisticated forms of supervaluationism (like those discussed in Field
(:994); McGee and McLaughlin (:994);Williams (2008c)) will require the stronger premise
that the intuitive desideratum determinately holds: Í (φ ↔ ψ). It’s not clear to me how
severely this stronger requirement weakens the argument (although I think this is a question
worth pursuing). See also Nolan (2006).
7C.f. Parfit (:984, 23:-243), Dougherty (20:3), and Goff (20:4, :84-:87).
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• Normative properties and normatively relevant descriptive properties
• Personhood and psychological or bodily continuity
• Consciousness and patterns of neural firings
• Special science properties and microphysical properties
The second avenue is closely related to the first. Instead of focusing on a
biconditional that relates the instantiation of the base property and the target
property, we use a range of properties of the same type as the base property to
construct a sorites sequence for the target property. Consider, for instance, the
GVAS as applied to normative properties. We tend to think that the instanti-
ation of normative properties comes with some descriptive base property. As
Miriam Schoenfield points out, this allows us to construct a sorites sequence:
Darryl is watching his two year old daughter play in a city park. It is permissible
to divert his attention from her for : second. it is not permissible to divert his
attention from her for 5 minutes. Is it permissible to divert his attention for 30
seconds? 3:? 32? Plausibly, we can create a Sorites series, admitting of borderline
cases of permissibility, out of a series of diversions whose lengths differ by a
second. (262)
The Darryl case draws our attention to a sort of tolerance principle that seems
to hold for the normative term ‘permissible’ which undergirds a sorites premise:
if looking away for n seconds is permissible, then looking for n + 1 seconds
is permissible. And similar cases have be constructed for personal identity
(Parfit, :984, 239), composition (Sider, 200:b, :24), and consciousness (Goff,
20:4, :84-:87).
2 The Reference Magnetic Interpretation of the GVAS
Taking the term picking out the target property to be vague, however, creates
some tension with the other two theses. Different proponents of the GVAS spell
out this tension with varying degrees of explication. Consider, for instance, an
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appeal to the GVAS by Williams (2008a), in which he argues from (V:) and
(V2) to the negation of (V3).8
Intuitively, it can be a vague matter at any given moment whether some cluster of
particles is uranium...so for an a such that it is vague whether a is uranium, is this
a mater of semantic vagueness?...if being uranium is primitive, this line of thought
is blocked....There seems no room to wriggle out of this by appeal to semantic
phenomena. What goes for uranium, of course, goes also for other kinds in
which we might take a metaphysical interest: being a person, being water or being
conscious....If uranium, or water, or consciousness, or being a person, are among
the perfectly natural properties, in Lewis’ sense, then to avoid ontic vagueness
one would have to insist, counter-intuitively, that there are sharp boundaries to
the application of such properties....Such ‘metaphysical brutalism’ might still be
consistent with an epistemic account of the vagueness...But unless brutalism is an
option, there seems no way in appropriate cases to avoid regarding the vagueness
of whether or not something is uranium as an instance of ontic vagueness. (2008a,
:4:-:42)
Williams is plainly appealing to the GVAS. And although several crucial steps
in his argument are left implicit, we can use his discussion as a starting point for
explicating the tension between (V:)-(V3). To show that (V:)-(V3) are inconsis-
tent, it suffices to construct an argument from two of the claims to the negation
of the third. Williams takes (V:) and (V2) as premises and shows that (V3) is
false. That is, he takes as premises that the predicate ‘uranium’ is vague and that
being uranium is perfectly natural, and argues from these claims that there must
be metaphysical vagueness. More generally he takes as premises:
(i) The predicate ‘F ’ is vague
(ii) The property picked out by ‘F ’ is perfectly natural
He then argues that the vagueness is neither semantic nor epistemic, concluding
that the vagueness must be metaphysical:
(iii) If ‘F ’ picks out a perfectly natural property, ‘F ’ is not semantically vague
8While Williams is pointing to the tension between (V:)-(V3) as a way to motivate meta-
physical indeterminacy, he officially remains neutral as to which of (V:)-(V3) to reject.
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(iv) If ‘F ’ picks out a perfectly natural property, ‘F ’ is not epistemically vague
(v) If ‘F ’ is neither semantically vague nor epistemically vague, then there is
a sentence that is metaphysically vague
(vi) Therefore: there is a sentence that is metaphysically vague.
The argument is clearly valid and we’re assuming premises (i) and (ii). Premise
(v) follows from (MV). If ‘F ’ is vague, there plausibly is some sentence S that
includes ‘F ’ and inherits the vagueness of ‘F ’. For example, there will be some
vague sentence of the form ‘Fa’ where ‘a’ is not vague. If ‘F ’ is neither semanti-
cally vague nor epistemically vague, then removing the semantic and epistemic
vagueness won’t remove the vagueness of S and, by (MV), we have metaphysical
vagueness. The controversial premises, then, are (iii) and (iv).
2.: Naturalness and Semantic Vagueness
Why does Williams think that regarding being uranium as a vague perfectly
natural property leaves ‘no room to wriggle out of this by appeal to semantic
phenomena’. Why can’t the vagueness in ‘F ’ be semantic?
While Williams kept the details of this step in his argument implicit, other
philosophers who have appealed to the GVAS have been more explicit about
the difficulty of treating ‘F ’ as semantically vague. When this step is made ex-
plicit, proponents of GVAS appeal to a meta-semantic theory known as reference
magnetism. Consider, for example, Dougherty’s (20:3) discussion of the GVAS:
...a natural kind can act as a ‘reference magnet’ for a term. Let us suppose
for now that there is a unique set of things that constitutes the natural kind,
orangutan...Now, assuming we reject a metaphysical view of vagueness, this nat-
ural kind has a precise boundary: everything is in this set or it is not. Therefore,
our use of the word ‘orangutan’ would pick out a precise set of things. (6-7) [...]
Robust realism can be understood as the view that ethical kinds have the same
metaphysical status as natural kinds: they form part of the metaphysical struc-
ture of the world, which obtains entirely independently of humans’ thoughts and
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practice. (9)9
Sider is also explicit about the role reference magnetism plays in his use of
the GVAS. He argues that ‘existence’ cannot be vague – a claim that is used to
great effect in the vagueness arguments for unrestricted composition and four
dimensionalism, and in order to respond to ontological deflationists that take
ontological questions to be indeterminate. Sider (2009b, 4:0) writes: “[The
thesis of] Indeterminacy says that ‘there exists’ in English is semantically in-
determinate over various candidates; but if [perfectly natural] existence is a
reference magnet, then ‘there exists’ determinately means [perfectly natural]
existence.":0,::
Each of these authors appeal to a meta-semantic view dubbed ‘reference mag-
netism’. As Weatherson (2003) describes the view:
Sometimes our words refer to a particular property or object rather than another,
not because our dispositions make this so, but because of some particular feature
of that property or object. David Lewis calls this extra feature ‘naturalness’:
some properties and objects are more natural than others, and when our verbal
dispositions do not discriminate between different possible contents, naturalness
steps in to finish the job, and the more natural property or object becomes the
content. (484)
Our linguistic dispositions only go so far in establishing the reference of our
words; the naturalness of the possible referents of our terms also plays a role in
determining reference. In particular, if there are a range of properties p1,...,pn
that are consistent with our use of predicate ‘F ’, then if one of those properties
9Two notes are important. First: Dougherty doesn’t distinguish between perfectly natural
kinds and relatively natural kinds. Second: Dougherty suggests several ways in which to avoid
the GVAS – for instance by giving up the claim that there is a unique natural kind or adopting
epistemicism; I discuss these avenues of escape below. What’s important here is that he seems
to think that if there is a single natural kind, then terms picking out that natural kind won’t be
semantically vague.
:0See also Sider (20::, §5).
::While Sider formulates his argument using a proprietary structure operator (S ) that at-
taches directly to the quantifier, we can follow Heim and Kratzer (:998) and Dorr (2005) in
treating existential quantifiers as second-order properties, allowing us to treat Sider’s appeal as
another instance of the GVAS.
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is more natural than the rest, ‘F ’ refers to that property. In this way, natural-
ness can resolve semantic indeterminacy left over from our linguistic disposi-
tions. But, as Weatherson points out, sometimes naturalness fails to resolve the
semantic indeterminacy:
Well that is what happens when things go well. Vagueness happens when things
do not go well. Sometimes our verbal dispositions do not discriminate between
several different contents, and no one of these is more natural than all the rest. In
these cases there will be many unnatural contents not eliminated by our dispo-
sitions which naturalness does manage to eliminate, but there will still be many
contents left uneliminated....Hence there is no precise fact about what the phrase
denotes. Hence it is vague. (484)
Semantic indeterminacy results when neither our linguistic dispositions nor
naturalness privilege one of a range of candidate referents for a term. Suppose
being uranium is perfectly natural and ‘uranium’ is vague. Assume for reductio
that the vagueness is semantic. That would mean that there is range of prop-
erties p1,...,pn that are consistent with our usage of the term ‘uranium’, none
more natural than the rest. But at least one of the properties would have to be
perfectly natural. (After all, ‘uranium’ refers to one of those properties, so one
of those properties is being uranium, which by hypothesis is perfectly natural.)
If only one of the properties were perfectly natural, then one of the proper-
ties would be more natural than the rest and there wouldn’t be any semantic
vagueness.
There appears to be only one way to posit semantic vagueness in ‘uranium’:
treat all of the properties p1,...,pn in the range as perfectly natural.:2 But I
doubt we should ‘wriggle out’ of the GVAS in this way. Such an abundance of
perfectly natural properties is an over-abundance: it violates considerations of
ideological parsimony.
:2Dougherty (20:3) discusses this possibility with vague moral properties. He does not
distinguish between perfectly natural kinds and relatively natural kinds and my criticism here
only applies to those that take the term in the GVAS to pick out perfectly natural properties –
positing a range of relatively natural kinds does not violate considerations of parsimony. Plausi-
bly, though, a thorough-going moral realist (of a Moorean stripe) does take moral properties to
be perfectly natural. As Dougherty himself describes the view he calls ‘robust moral realism’:
“ethical properties are part of the deep underlying metaphysical structure of the world" (7).
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Theorists disagree over how parsimony considerations are best cashed out
in terms of natural properties. As Lewis originally thought of perfectly nat-
ural properties, the perfectly natural properties are supposed to form a mini-
mal supervenience basis. On this more traditional understanding, parsimony
considerations tell against hypotheses that include modally redundant perfectly
natural properties. According to more modern developments of the notion (c.f.
Sider (20::)), the perfectly natural properties are supposed to form a minimal
reductive basis; i.e. it is thought that all facts reduce to facts involving only
perfectly natural properties, where different theorists disagree over the relevant
notion of reduction. On this more contemporary understanding, parsimony
considerations tell against hypotheses that include perfectly natural properties
that are explanatorily idle – where the form of explanation is supposed to be
distinctively metaphysical.
On either understanding of parsimony, it is highly implausible that there
exist a range of perfectly natural properties that serve as referents for terms
like ‘person’, ‘wrong’, ‘conscious’, or ‘uranium’. The first understanding of
parsimony simply appears to be a non-starter for claiming that there is even
a single perfectly natural property that serves as a candidate referent for our
term, at least for properties like being uranium, being a person, or being wrong,
which seem plainly to supervene on microphysical properties. This superve-
nience would create inexplicable, brute connections between the perfectly nat-
ural property and the microphysical.
Even if we were comfortable with this brute connection, or we allowed
duplicate microphysical worlds in which the putative natural property is not
instantiated (which some may want to do, for instance, in the case of conscious-
ness), it is even more difficult to maintain that there are a range of such prop-
erties. Consider the case of personal identity. Suppose we have a situation in
which there are a range of properties – personhood1, personhood2, personhood3...
– each of which is perfectly natural. On the more traditional supervenience
understanding of natural properties, these properties would have to be modally
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independent. That would require there to be pairs of worlds with the same mi-
crophysical structure and with the same instantiation pattern of personhood2,
personhood3, personhood4, etc. that differed with respect to whether personhood1
were instantiated. The result would do significant violence to our ordinary in-
tuitions of what is possible. But the cost of salvaging our modal intuitions is to
posit an additional set of inexplicable, brute connections between the natural
properties.
The situation is no better on a reductive understanding of parsimony. Per-
haps facts about wrongness, consciousness, etc. cannot be reduced to a micro-
physical basis, thus forcing us to accept such properties as perfectly natural.
But there are no facts that require a range of natural properties in order to be
explained – at least no facts that don’t involve the indeterminacy operator.
If positing a range of perfectly natural properties is out of the question, and
there is only one perfectly natural property – being uranium – in the range of
properties that are consistent with our use of the term ‘uranium’, then that
property will attract the reference of our terms, closing off room for semantic
vagueness.
2.2 Naturalness and Epistemicism
The last option for avoiding the GVAS is to claim that the vague predicate ‘F ’
is epistemically indeterminate. Williams hints at a strategy for rejecting this
option in order to secure premise (iv): epistemicism requires a sort of objec-
tionable ‘metaphysical brutalism’. The epistemicist must admit that a single
atom can make the difference between consciousness and lack of consciousness
or the difference between being a person and not being a person. She will ac-
cept that there are two scenarios that are incredibly alike, save the location of a
single atom, in which the atoms form a person in the first case but not in the
second. But that seems incredible. Sider puts the worry best in his discussion
of composition::3
:3Similar complaints of brutalism also appear in Dougherty (20:3).
5:
To postulate such a sharp cut-off would be to admit that the realm of the macro-
scopic is in some sense ‘autonomous’ of the microscopic....there would seem to
be something ‘metaphysically arbitrary’ about a sharp cut-off in a continuous se-
ries of cases of composition. Why is the cut-off here, rather than there? Sider
(200:b, :24)
The very same considerations that are in play when deciding whether or not
to accept brutalism for composition are in play when deciding whether or not to
accept brutalism for properties like personhood, etc., assuming that those proper-
ties are perfectly natural. That is, it would metaphysically arbitrary for a funda-
mental macro-property like personhood or permissibility to have such a fickle
relationship with the microphysical. It’s no wonder then, that the very same
dismissal of brutalism is found with respect to permissibility (Schoenfield,
20:6), consciousness (Goff, 20:4, :84-:87), and personal identity (Parfit, :984,
239):4
Note that the sharp-cut offs required for the epistemicist to avoid the GVAS
are different from the typical cutoffs they posit for predicates like ‘bald’. The
brutalism typically associated with epistemicism is one in which there are many
equally eligible candidate meanings for our terms and it’s an arbitrary fact that
our usage privilege one of these candidate meanings. But a brute cutoff in the
application of a fundamental property requires a metaphysical arbitrariness, ac-
cording to which one of the candidate meanings is more natural than the rest.:5
It is this metaphysical arbitrariness that Sider and others find objectionable.:6
***
Once this form of the GVAS is noticed, it is easy to replicate that argument
in various domains. Consider Parfit’s argument for reductionism about per-
sonal identity. Parfit constructs a sorites sequence for personal identity using
:4Other metaphysicians have found such metaphysically brute cutoffs unobjectionable: see
Markosian (:998) and Nolan (2006).
:5C.f. Sider (200:b, :3:-:32)
:6Even if we were somehow able to accept the metaphysical arbitrariness required to posit
a sharp cut-off, the standard epistemicist explanation for our ignorance in cases of vagueness,
due toWilliamson (:994), cannot be extended to vagueness in terms targeted by the GVAS. See
Wasserman (20:2) for brief discussion.
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the base properties of psychological or bodily continuity and notes that this
puts pressure on us to accept that personal identity can be vague (V:). He is
focused on semantic conceptions of vagueness (V3). And he takes these two
claims to lend support for a Reductionist View of personal identity, according
to which personal identity is not a fundamental feature of reality (rejection of
(V2)). What is supposed to be the source of the tension? Parfit writes:
It is hard to believe (:)...that, in one of these [intuitively borderline] cases, the
resulting person would quite straightforwardly be me, and that, in the next case,
he would quite straightforwardly be someone else. It is also hard to believe (2)
that there must be a such a sharp borderline, somewhere in the Spectrum, though
we could never have any evidence where the borderline would be...claims (:) and
(2), taken together, are extremely implausible. I believe that they are even more
implausible than the only other possible conclusion, which is the Reductionist
View (:984, 239)
Yet, no argument explaining why the Reductionist View is the only other
possible conclusion is given. In other words: why can’t one accept Parfit’s
argument for the semantic vagueness of personal identity yet retain the view
that personal identity is fundamental?:7 The reference magnetic GVAS gives us
a way of filling in the argument. We can understand the Reductionist View, on
which personal identity is not fundamental, as the claim that being a person is
not perfectly natural.:8 On this understanding, the reference magnetic GVAS
:7Here’s the closest argument that I could construct from the text: Parfit seems to think that
the only feasible non-reductionist view is one in which there is a separate existing object, like a
soul, distinct from the body or brain (240). Perhaps he thinks that existence cannot be vague
as a matter of semantic vagueness. Therefore, a non-reductionist view will yield determinate
answers to intuitively borderline cases. If this is Parfit’s argument, it is certainly never made
explicit. Two further points are relevant. First: that argument merely moves the bump in the
rug. The best argument against semantically vague existence is due to Sider and is itself an
instance of GVAS (discussed in the main text above). Second: that argument relies on claiming
that the only feasible non-reductionist position is one that posits a separate existing entity. But
Parfit gives no argument for the infeasiblity of a non-reductionist view that doesn’t posit a
separate existing entity (the view he calls the Further Fact View (2:0)).
:8See Sider (20::) for a guide to understanding fundamentality and reduction in terms of nat-
uralness (or in his jargon, structure) (although see Bennett (Forthcoming) for a broader dis-
cussion of ways of understanding fundamentality.) Eklund (2004, 492) plays with the idea that
being a person picks out a natural kind, and notes that a reference-magnetic metasemantics may
then force determinacy in the term ‘person’ despite our facts about our use under-determining
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justifies Parfit in taking the non-metaphysical vagueness in personal identity to
support a reductionist view: on a non-reductionist view, personhood would be
a reference magnet which prevents vagueness in claims of personal identity.
Similar remarks apply to Barnes (20:4), who argues that there is vagueness in
various fundamental properties (specifically morality and existence) and takes
this to imply metaphysical vagueness. It’s not clear, however, why the vague-
ness for a fundamental property cannot be semantic or epistemic rather than
metaphysical. The reference-magnetic GVAS also gives us a way to fill in her
argument for this conclusion.
3 Vague Naturalness as Ersatz Metaphysical Vague-
ness
With the GVAS fully documented and interpreted, several strategies for resist-
ing it become immediately obvious. We can, for instance, give up a reference
magnetic meta-semantics. I, however, want to explore a more subtle strategy
for resisting the GVAS – one that doesn’t give up on the reference magnetic
meta-semantics many find promising.
That strategy takes the term ‘perfectly natural’ to be a predicate of proper-
ties:9, but treats the term as vague, where the vagueness is not metaphysical.20
In the material mode, the strategy claims that for some particular property, it’s
meaning. (Eklund does not appeal to the GVAS; he merely claims that the naturalness of per-
sonal identity may lead to determinacy, not that it is inconsistent with indeterminacy.) See
also Miller (20:0) for an argument that persons are a sui generis ontological kind. Although
Miller is not claiming that being a person is perfectly natural, I think her arguments provide the
materials to support such a claim. See Sider (200:a) for a denial of the claim that being a person
is a perfectly natural property.
:9Lewis (:983a) discusses this option for those that don’t wish to posit universals in their
ontology.
20The position is thus importantly different from the one advocated in Cameron (20:0),
according to which relative naturalness facts are ontically vague and they determinate a strict
ordering of properties in terms of naturalness. I, on the other hand, am claiming that the
perfect naturalness facts are semantically vague, even if they only determine a weak ordering of
properties in terms of naturalness. (Cameron does not discuss the GVAS argument schema.)
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indeterminate whether that property is perfectly natural. I call this position er-
satz metaphysical vagueness because of its ability to mimic genuine metaphysical
vagueness. I’ll show that the mv-ersatzer can resolve the GVAS in three steps.
Step :. I’ll argue that the mv-ersatzer can acknowledge that terms like ‘person’,
‘permissible’, ‘uranium’, ‘conscious’, etc. are vague while declaring that
personhood, permissibility, being uranium, consciousness, etc. are per-
fectly natural.
Step 2. I’ll argue that taking ‘natural’ to be vague doesn’t require metaphysical
vagueness.
Step 3. I’ll argue that taking terms like ‘person’, ‘permissible’, ‘uranium’, ‘con-
scious’, to be vague, while simultaneously picking out perfectly natural
properties, doesn’t require metaphysical naturalness.
The first step establishes (V:)-(V2). The last two steps establish that (V3) is
preserved.
4 Step One: Vague Natural Properties
The first step of my proposal is to argue that, by taking ‘perfectly natural’ to be
vague, the mv-ersatzer can jointly endorse (V:) and (V2): they can acknowledge
that terms like ‘person’, ‘permissible’, ‘uranium’, ‘conscious’, etc. are vague
while simultaneously declaring that personhood, permissibility, being uranium,
consciousness, etc. are perfectly natural.
Suppose personhood is perfectly natural. The predicate ‘is a person’ is vague:
it’s vague which extension it refers to. Thus, the singular term ‘personhood’ is
vague: there are several candidate properties p1, p2, p3,... and it’s vague which
is the referent of the singular term. According to the mv-ersatzer, the predicate
of properties ‘is perfectly natural’ is also vague. It includes only one of p1, p2,
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p3,... in its extension, but it’s vague which. But, if there is a penumbral connec-
tion between ‘personhood’ and ‘is perfectly natural’ such that the referent of
the term ‘personhood’ is in the extension of ‘is perfectly natural’, then it’s deter-
minately the case that the property personhood is perfectly natural. We would
expect exactly such a penumbral connection if, for example, it was part of the
meaning of ‘personhood’ that it pick out a metaphysically significant, perfectly
natural property.
We can explicate this penumbral connection in precisificational terms. There
are several properties p1, p2, p3... that are candidate referents for the term ‘per-
sonhood’ and several candidate extensions for the predicate ‘is perfectly natural’.
On some precisifications, ‘personhood’ refers to p1, on others it refers to p2,
p3,.... On some precisifications, the extension of ‘is perfectly natural’ includes
p1 and not p2, p3,.... On others it includes exactly one of p2, p3, etc. But on
every precisification, the referent of ‘personhood’ on that precisification is in the
extension of ‘is perfectly natural’ on that precisification.
So, although it’s vague what ‘personhood’ refers to (it’s unsettled which prop-
erty is the property of personhood) and it’s vague what extension ‘perfectly natu-
ral’ refers to (it’s unsettled which properties are perfectly natural), it’s not vague
that the referent of ‘personhood’ is in the extension of ‘is perfectly natural’ (it’s
settled that the property personhood is perfectly natural). And what goes for
‘person’ goes for other predicates targeted by the GVAS. Thus, the mv-ersatzer
can retain (V:) and (V2).
I argued that the mv-ersatzer can accommodate (V:)-(V2). It remains to
show that the mv-ersatzer can retain (V3) – to show that mv-ersatzism doesn’t
require metaphysical vagueness. I do this in the next two sections. First, I
argue that the vagueness in ‘natural’ is not metaphysical. Then, I show that
the vagueness in the term targeted by the GVAS (‘person’, ‘uranium’, etc.) is
not metaphysical – despite the fact that the term picks out a perfectly natural
property.
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5 Step Two: Vague Naturalness is not Metaphysi-
cal Vagueness
It may be thought that in taking perfect naturalness as vague, the mv-ersatzer is
positing a sort of metaphysical vagueness. Many metaphysicians (most promi-
nently Sider (20::)) have understood claims of fundamentality in terms of nat-
uralness: a property is fundamental iff it’s perfectly natural. On a naturalness-
based conception of fundamentality, the mv-ersatzer seems to be claiming that
the fundamental is indeterminate. Is that not a sort of metaphysical vagueness?
It is not. I’ll spot my opponent a natural-based conception of fundamen-
tality. Even with this concession, the thought that vague perfect naturalness is
a sort of metaphysical vagueness arises from a confusion between two theses.
Consider the thesis that indeterminacy is fundamental:
Indeterminacy is Fundamental (IiF) The indeterminacy operator is fundamen-
tal.
Admittedly (IiF) is stated in obscure terms. But, let’s simply reflect on (IiF) in
its present gloss for now. In particular let’s compare (IiF) with the claim that
it’s indeterminate what is fundamental:
Fundamentality is Indeterminate (FiI) For some property p, it’s indetermi-
nate whether p is fundamental
Distinguish (IiF) and (FiI). (IiF) says that facts about indeterminacy are
fundamental; (FiI) says that it is indeterminate what counts as fundamental.
The difference is significant: (IiF) is problematic whereas (FiI) is not.
From the looks of it, (IiF) entails (MV): if indeterminacy is fundamental or
‘irreducible’, then its source is not linguistic or epistemic. (IiF), then, inherits
the implausibility of (MV). Indeed, one of the reasons we found (MV) so im-
plausible was because its best developments adopt a thesis like (IiF) according to
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which the indeterminacy operator is taken as an irreducible piece of ideology.
But, like those (Lewis, :986) that find it strange to think of the world as irre-
ducibly modal, it’s strange to think of the world as irreducibly indeterminate.
Indeed, both Barnes and Williams (20::, fn. 4) and Sider (20::, §7.:2) take (IiF)
as a sufficient condition for metaphysical vagueness.
What about (FiI)? Some writers seem to conflate (FiI) with (IiF). For in-
stance, Sider (20::) claims that the “fundamental is determinate” and proposes
that we understand this claim as requiring the rejection of (IiF), suggesting that
(IiF) is a sufficient condition for metaphysical vagueness, which he rules out.
But, in later arguments, he conflates (FiI) with (IiF), appealing to the rejection
of the former rather than the later.2:
Other authors distinguish (FiI) from (IiF), but take it as obvious that both
are inconsistent with semantic or epistemic treatments of vagueness. For in-
stance, Barnes (20:4, §2) reflects on the distinction between (FiI) and (IiF) but
takes both as sufficient for metaphysical vagueness.22 But she gives no argument
for this claim. Surely we shouldn’t take it as obvious that (FiI) is inconsistent
with semantic treatments of vagueness.
Indeed, I claim that (FiI), understood as claiming that the term ‘perfectly
natural’ is vague, is entirely consistent with there being no metaphysical vague-
ness – for the vagueness to be entirely semantic. I am not the first one to claim
that the term ‘natural’ is semantically vague – or at least semantically indetermi-
2:For instance, Sider considers the reason Dorr and Hawthorne adduce for taking ‘natural’
to be indeterminate (discussed below) and rejects it: “one might try to avoid the [hard] choice
by saying that, although it’s determinately the case that some logical connectives carve at the
joints, it’s indeterminate which ones do. But [earlier discussion] argued against indeterminacy
at the fundamental level" (2:7).
22Although she admits to being “tempted by the thought that a case for metaphysical inde-
terminacy – or at least an interesting case for metaphysical indeterminacy – requires a commit-
ment to [(IiF)]" (347) she does think that (FiI) entails (MV) in that the indeterminacy involved
in (FiI) would be non-semantic and non-epistemic. For instance, she treats (FiI) as a type of
metaphysical indeterminacy and claims that metaphysical indeterminacy is “indeterminacy that
would remain even if we spoke a perfect language and were omniscient" (339). And in her dis-
cussion of instances of (FiI) she claims that “the indeterminacy doesn’t arise from imprecision
in language" (358).
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nate. Dorr and Hawthorne (20:4) arrive at this conclusion, not by reflecting on
the GVAS, but by considering perfectly natural asymmetric relations and their
inverses. For instance: consider the set-theoretic relation is a member of borne
by a member to the set that it is a member of. And consider the inverse relation
contains borne by a set to one of its members. Which of the two relations is a
member of or contains should be the perfectly natural relation? Given that the
natural properties are supposed to form a minimal reductive basis, we shouldn’t
conclude that both relations are perfectly natural. Yet it seems objectionably ar-
bitrary to take only one of the relations to be perfectly natural, as there doesn’t
seem to be anything about perfectly naturalness that could distinguish between
the relation and its inverse. The only solution seems to be to treat ‘perfectly
natural’ as indeterminate in reference. Although it’s determinate that exactly
one of the two relations is perfectly natural, it’s indeterminate which.
Of course, the above argument at best shows that ‘perfectly natural’ is in-
determinate in these very particular cases. But the case of asymmetric relations
discussed by Dorr and Hawthorne is importantly analogous to the situation
faced by anyone who wishes to retain (V:) and (V2). On the one hand, we are
under pressure to think that one and only one of various properties that are
candidate referents for terms like ‘is conscious’, ‘is a person’, ‘is uranium’ etc.,
is perfectly natural, but for any such property, it’s arbitrary to think that it is
privileged.
Let’s try to develop that proposal in more detail. If we are to show that ‘per-
fectly natural’ is semantically vague in the particular way required to dissolve
the GVAS, we need to explain the source of this semantic vagueness. ‘Perfectly
natural’ is a theoretical term, introduced in a theory of naturalness proposed by
Lewis (:983a). Presumably the term ‘natural’ gets its meaning in the way other
theoretical terms get their meanings: in virtue of certain core theoretical roles
specified by the theory in which the term is introduced.23
23C.f. Lewis (:970). The insight to treat ‘natural’ in this framework is a key illuminating
theme in Dorr and Hawthorne (20:4).
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At its heart, the idea that theoretical terms get their meaning from their
theoretical role is simple. We propose a theory T that uses a new predicate ‘F ’.
By replacing that predicate with a variable, we get an open sentence that doesn’t
include the new predicate. That open sentence defines the theoretical role of F -
ness, giving us a natural way to specify the meaning of the new predicate. The
predicate ‘F ’ refers to the property that plays that theoretical role of F -ness.
Sometimes, however, there is no property that perfectly plays the entirety
of the theoretical role specified by the term-introducing theory. Nevertheless,
we want to say that the term refers. The simple idea is in need of at least two
refinements. First: a property can be closer or farther from perfectly satisfying
a particular theoretical role. Second: certain theoretical roles are more or less
negotiable than others (Lewis, :997, 334). We might, for instance, take natural-
ness’s role in fixing reference to be a more provisional, less definitional part of
the theory of naturalness, so a theorist can sensibly claim that some properties
are natural but decline to endorse reference magnetism. The ‘semantic gods’
assign to the theoretical term that property which does best in terms of most
closely satisfying the more definitional theoretical roles.24
What if there is no unique property that does ‘best’? In such cases, we
should say that the theoretical terms are vague. Consider, for instance, Field’s
(:973) discussion of Newtonian mass. The theoretical role outlined for ‘mass’
in the laws of Newtonian mechanics is equally-well satisfied by two proper-
ties posited by relativistic physical theories: rest-mass and inertial-mass (and
no other property satisfies that role better). The natural thing to say in this
case is that ‘mass’ in Newton’s theory was indeterminate in reference between
rest-mass and inertial-mass.
There is another, less discussed, way in which a theoretical term can be
vague: if the theoretical roles that the term is supposed to play are specified in
vague language. Consider a psychologist giving a theory that includes a new
24If no property does well enough, the term fails to refer (in the way ‘phogiston’ fails to
refer).
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theoretical term, say, ‘flow’. A theory of flow might include various vague
terms like ‘concentration’ or ‘interest’. When we replace ‘flow’ from the theory
of flow with a variable, we are left with an open sentence that states the various
theoretical roles in vague terms. Because the role of flow is itself vague, it will
thus be vague which property best satisfies that role. The situation parallels that
of a vague definite description stated in vague language, like ‘the first bald man
to walk in the room’.
In both cases of vague theoretical terms, there is no spooky metaphysical
vagueness: the vagueness is of a mundane semantic sort resulting from under-
determination in the term-introducing theory. But are any of these stories of
indeterminacy plausible for naturalness? Lewis introduced the term ‘perfectly
natural’ via a theory in which naturalness was supposed to play a certain role in
relation to resemblance, laws, reference, etc. But if our notions of resemblance,
laws, and reference are vague, then the theoretical role of naturalness will be
vague, in which case we should expect ‘perfectly natural’ to be vague.25
Consider naturalness’s relation to resemblance. According to Lewis’ theory
of naturalness: “Natural properties [are] the ones whose sharing makes for re-
semblance" (Lewis, :983a, :3). Indeed, Lewis seems to treat the resemblance role
as a more definitional, less negotiable theoretical role, suggesting a nominalist
“define natural properties in terms of the mutual resemblance of their mem-
bers and their non-members" (:4). So, if our notion of resemblance is vague,
we would expect naturalness to be vague. And from the perspective of some-
one who takes properties like personhood, consciousness, permissibility, etc. to be
perfectly natural, it’s very plausible that resemblance is vague.
Take the perspective of someone who think that personhood is perfectly nat-
ural. Consider a determinate person, Mary, and a sorites sequence of candidate-
persons – Bob1, Bob2,...,Bob100 – such that Bob1 is determinately a person and
25In a footnote, Dorr and Hawthorne (20:4, fn. 89) suggest that one set of properties might
uniquely satisfy the theoretical role of naturalness but it might be indeterminate which; this
can be seen as an attempt to vindicate that suggestion by claiming that the theoretical role is
specified in vague language.
6:
Bob100 is determinately not a person. Now, suppose we ask, for each n: do
Mary and Bobn share a feature of resemblance? From the perspective of some-
one who thinks that personhood is perfectly natural, plainly they will answer
‘yes’ for n = 1 (otherwise, personhood wouldn’t make for resemblance so per-
sonhood wouldn’t be perfectly natural.) And, plainly the answer is ‘no’ for
n = 100 (suppose Mary doesn’t share any natural properties besides person-
hood with any of the Bobs). At what point – at which Bob – does Mary stop
sharing a feature of resemblance? One answer would posit a determinate cut-
off at which Mary stops sharing a feature of resemblance. A more plausible
response, however, acknowledges that ‘resemblance’ is vague: for some middle
Bob (say n = 50) it’s vague whether Mary shares a feature of resemblance with
that Bob. (And because, determinately, personhood makes for resemblance,
‘person’ is also vague.) Because naturalness is introduced in terms of resem-
blance, we should expect ‘perfectly natural’ to be vague and for the vagueness
to match the vagueness in ‘resemblance’ and ‘person’.
On the proposal we’re sketching, perfect naturalness is introduced in terms
of resemblance. It’s definitely the case that personhood makes for resemblance
although ‘person’ and ‘resembles’ are vague. In naturalness terms: it’s definitely
the case that personhood is perfectly natural, although ‘person’ and ‘perfectly
natural’ are vague.
This is only one avenue through which vagueness can be introduced in the
term ‘perfectly natural’, without the vagueness being metaphysical in any prob-
lematic sense: other theoretical roles are also plausibly vague. Fundamental laws
of nature are the axioms of the system stated in perfectly natural terms which
best balances simplicity and strength. If we think that properties like permissi-
bility, consciousness, personhood, composition, etc. figure in moral, phenomenal-
physical, or metaphysical laws, we should admit that the notion of ‘law’ is
vague. For example, it will be vague which of the following law-candidates
is the metaphysical law of personhood:26
26Sider (20::, §:2) acknowledges that metaphysical laws might be vague.
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Law Candidate : x is a person1 iff φ1(x)
Law Candidate 2 x is a person2 iff φ2(x)
Law Candidate 3 x is a person3 iff φ3(x)
where φ1(x),φ2(x), ... state various criteria of bodily / psychological continuity
in perfectly natural microphysical language. If our notion of lawhood is vague,
and we define the predicate ‘perfectly natural’ in terms of lawhood, then we
would expect ‘perfectly natural’ to also be vague.
Let’s recap. The mv-ersatzer claims that it’s vague which of a range of prop-
erties ‘person’ refers to. She admits that one of those properties plays the role of
perfect naturalness – it makes for resemblance, laws, etc. – although it’s vague
which. That’s because the vagueness in the theoretical role of naturalness creates
vagueness in the term ‘perfectly natural’.
There is, of course, a serious gap in the argument. We haven’t discussed the
role that naturalness plays in fixing reference. Even if reference magnetism isn’t
a definitional theoretical role for naturalness – even if the meaning of ‘perfectly
natural’ doesn’t come from naturalness’s role in fixing reference – many have
found reference magnetism to be a plausible theory of reference. It remains to
show how the mv-ersatzer can allow terms like ‘person’ to be semantically vague
when personhood is perfectly natural – while retaining naturalness’s reference
magnetic theoretical role. In the following section, I show how vagueness in
naturalness together with reference magnetism predicts the vagueness in terms
like ‘person’ which pick out a perfectly natural property.27
27In what follows, I will assume that reference magnetism isn’t a definitional theoretical role
of naturalness – that it doesn’t fix the meaning of ‘perfectly natural’ – and thus will show
how vague naturalness induces vagueness in reference via reference magnetism. Nothing hangs
on this decision. If we prefer to treat reference magnetism as a definitional theoretical role of
naturalness, then the results of the next section should be interpreted as showing how vagueness
in reference induces vagueness in naturalness via reference magnetism in the following way:
As with ‘resembles’, ‘refers’ is vague. So we should expect a theoretical role specified in
terms of reference to also be vague. The mv-ersatzer claimed that it’s vague what ‘person’ refers
to. If it’s part of the theoretical role of naturalness that terms like ‘personhood’ refer to the
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6 Step Three: Vague Natural Properties is NotMeta-
physical Vagueness
6.: Where the GVAS Went Wrong
Recall the argument from §2.: that sought to show that terms that pick out
perfectly natural properties cannot be semantically vague. Suppose personhood
is perfectly natural. Semantic vagueness results when our linguistic dispositions
fail to privilege one of a range of properties as the referent for a term, and
none of those properties is more natural than the rest. But (unless there is a
range of perfectly natural properties) then there will be a property, personhood,
which is more natural than the other properties in the range, because personhood
is perfectly natural and the other properties are not. Therefore: there is no
semantic vagueness.
That argument is invalid. In particular, it straightforwardly commits the fal-
lacy of denying the antecedent. In our earlier discussion of reference magnetism,
we took Weatherson’s (2003) discussion as a guide, and drew two conclusions.
The first outlined the role naturalness plays in determining reference:
(2:) If there are a range of properties p1,...,pn that are consistent with our use
of predicate ‘F ’, then if one of those properties is more natural than the
rest, ‘F ’ refers to that property.
The second outlined how semantic vagueness might remain despite naturalness’s
role in determining reference:
(22) If there are a range of properties p1,...,pn that are consistent with our use
perfectly natural property among the candidate meanings, this theoretical role will be vague.
Because it’s indeterminate which property ‘personhood’ refers to, but it determiantely refers to
the perfectly natural one, it will be vague which property is perfectly natural. As with the rest
of the theoretical role, the reference-role will be satisfied by one of the candidate-extensions for
‘perfectly natural’ – although it will be vague which.
64
of predicate ‘F ’, and if none of those properties is more natural than the
rest, then it’s vague which of these properties ‘F ’ refers to.
Note the direction of the conditional in (22): it gives a sufficient condition
for semantic vagueness. It does not give a necessary condition for semantic
vagueness. The argument that sought to eliminate the possibility of semantic
vagueness merely shows that one way a predicate may be semantically vague is
not satisfied and fallaciously concludes that there is no semantic vagueness.
But, clearly there are other ways for semantic vagueness to crop up. Indeed,
even if we thought that semantic vagueness must result from naturalness’s fail-
ure to privilege a particular candidate meaning (which I doubt), there are at
least two ways in which naturalness might fail to privilege a particular candi-
date. One way is given by (22): no property is more natural than the rest. But
there is a second way: it may be vague which property is more natural than the
rest. If perfectly natural properties are reference magnets that anchor our terms,
and it’s vague which property is the reference magnet, it will be vague which
property our term is anchored to.
We can see this a bit more carefully by considering the implications of the
theoretical role of naturalness specified by (2:). Consider the range of properties
personhood1,..., personhoodn that are consistent with our use of ‘person’ such
that it’s indeterminate which of those properties is the perfectly natural one.
The first antecedent of (2:) is satisfied for this predicate, so we have:
(23) If one of the properties personhood1,...,personhoodn is more natural than
the rest, ‘person’ refers to that property.
According to the mv-ersatzer, one of the properties personhood1,...,personhoodn
is more natural than the rest – but it’s vague which of the properties that is.
Thus, it’s vague which of these properties ‘person’ refers to. Thus, ‘person’ is
vague.
The idea is a simple one. There is more than one way for semantic vagueness
to arise; (22) only gives us one such way. But another way for there to be
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vagueness in reference is for there to be vagueness in the ingredients that fix
reference.
And the idea is a general one. It’s one that should be endorsed by anyone
who admits that there is vagueness in their meta-semantic theory – not just
the mv-ersatzer. For instance, even if ‘perfectly natural’ is determinate, many
philosophers are open to the idea that relative naturalness is vague: there is a
pair of properties such that it’s indeterminate whether one is at least as natural
as the other.28 Suppose our linguistic dispositions for a term fail to distinguish
between these two properties. Because it’s indeterminate which is more natural,
naturalness has failed to privilege one candidate-meaning. By (2:), we should
claim that the term is vague between these two properties.
The underlying suggestion applies regardless of what we take to be the ingre-
dients for reference, so long as those ingredients are vague. Set aside a reference-
magnetic meta-semantic theory and consider, for instance, how a causal theory
of reference should accommodate vagueness in causation. According to some
causal theories of reference, my token of the word ‘Mt. Kilimanjaro’ refers to
the object that stands in the right causal relation to my tokening.
(24) The name n refers to the object that stands in such-and-such causal rela-
tion to tokens of n.
But it might be vague which object stands in the right causal relation to
my tokening and, by (24), this vagueness induces vagueness in which object n
refers to. Suppose for the sake of argument that there is only one object – Mt.
Kilimanjaro – that stands in the right causal relation to my tokening of the name
‘Mt. Kilimanjaro’, although it’s vague which particular hunk of rock that one
object is. It’s natural to take the vagueness in which hunk of rock appropriately
causes my tokening of ‘Mt. Kilimanjaro’ to induce vagueness in the reference
of the name. Even if we object to the specifics of this case – perhaps because we
think Mt. Kilimanjaro is distinct from any hunk of rock – it’s undeniable that
28C.f. Cameron (20:0)
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the causal facts that fix reference can be vague, and it’s natural in these cases to
treat the vagueness in the causal facts as inducing vagueness in reference. On the
causal meta-semantic theory, if it’s vague which object my tokening is causally
anchored to, then it’s vague which object the name refers to.
None of this requires spooky metaphysical vagueness: causation is non-
metaphysically vague, and if reference is fixed by causation, reference will be
non-metaphysically vague. I’ve argued that naturalness might be non-meta-
physically vague, and if reference is fixed by naturalness, reference will be non-
metaphysically vague. Had we wanted to, we could have chosen to use the term
‘person’ a bit more carefully in order to pick out one of the range of candidate
properties.
Return again to the reference-magnetic meta-semantic theory. We can em-
bed the above observation into a supervaluationist theory. As Weatherson
pointed out, semantic vagueness results when there is a range of candidate-
meanings for a term, each of which is consistent with our use and none of which
is more natural than the other. Assume the at least as natural as relation is total.
Presumably, there will be ties between the relative naturalness of properties. In
this case, there will be sets of properties in which no property is more natural
than the rest. Thus, the strict ordering based on the more natural than relation
will be partial: for some pair of properties, neither will be more natural than
the other. In light of this observation, Weatherson offers the supervaluationist
a natural theory of precisifications according to which:
Every precisification is a completion of the ‘naturalness’ partial order. That is,
each precisification p defines a strict order on possible contents of terms, more
natural-p than, such that o1 is more natural-p than o2 if (but not only if) o1 is
more natural than o2. The particular content of terms according to p is then
defined by using the more-natural-p-than relation...(485)
As we’ve noted, there is another way, besides ties, that naturalness can fail
to privilege a particular content, and therefore fail to resolve all semantic in-
determinacy. By (2:), vagueness concerning which property is more natural
can also generate semantic indeterminacy. This suggests an obvious way to gen-
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eralize Weatherson’s suggestion. For some pairs of properties, it’s settled that
one property is more natural than the other. For other pairs of properties, it’s
not settled that one property is more natural than the other. That might be
because the two properties are tied in naturalness (it’s settled that neither prop-
erty is more natural than the other) or because the at least as natural as relation
is vague. We should generalize Weatherson’s proposal as follows: a precisifica-
tion is an assignment of content based on a way of ordering the naturalness of
properties that respects all settled naturalness comparisons of the more natu-
ral than ordering. In the absence of vagueness in naturalness, this account has
Weatherson’s as an instance.29
At this point, I can envision two reasons for hesitating. First: I’ve shown
that vagueness in ‘natural’, and the ensuing vagueness in terms like ‘person’,
is consistent with the reference magnetic role of naturalness as specified in
(2:). But (2:) isn’t a complete specification of that role. It’s not clear how
(or whether) vagueness in naturalness will fit into broader accounts of refer-
ence magnetism. Second, one might be worried that if vagueness in ‘natural’
can create vagueness in reference, then ‘natural’ can no longer play any role in
resolving semantic indeterminacy.
In the following section, I’ll address both of these hesitations. My response
to the first is to simply generalize my discussion above to broader accounts of
reference magnetism. We’ll see that this generalization unearths additional ways
vagueness in reference can be induced by vagueness in the metasemantic theory.
My response to the second is to distinguish radical from moderate semantic
indeterminacy and show that vague naturalness can resolve radical semantic in-
determinacy.
29This also gives us a theory of precisifications which vindicates Cameron’s (20:0) assumption
that metaphysical vagueness in relative naturalness leads to vagueness in reference.
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6.2 Generalized Reference Magnetism and Radical Indeter-
minacy
Reference isn’t radically indeterminate. The predicate ‘mountain’ has an exten-
sion that includes hunks of rock; it does not have an extension that includes ab-
stract objects like numbers. That reference isn’t radically indeterminate should
be treated as data. Treat interpretations as functions from basic terms in a lan-
guage to their referents under that interpretation. Names are assigned to objects;
n-place predicates are assigned to sets of n-tuples, etc. (Ignore context sensitivity
and other complications.) The data can then be put as follows: some interpre-
tations are clearly incorrect or unintended. For example, an interpretation that
maps the predicate ‘mountain’ to a set of numbers is clearly incorrect.
As Putnam points out, this data cannot be explained if the standard of cor-
rectness for an interpretation merely amounts to making a privileged set of sen-
tences in our language (‘total theory’) come out true under that interpretation.
In general, if there is one interpretation that makes total theory come out true
(that is, if the set of sentences are consistent) there will be a great many permu-
tations of that interpretation that also preserve truth of total theory – including
permutations that, say, assign the predicate mountain to a set of numbers. Some
of those permutations will be intuitively incorrect even though they make the
entirety of total theory true. So, the data cannot be explained by the truth of
total theory alone. What, then, does correctness for an interpretation amount
to?
In the course of giving his theory of naturalness, Lewis carves out a role
for naturalness to play in determining correctness for an interpretation and uses
that reference-fixing role to explain the fact that reference isn’t radically indeter-
minate.30 On Lewis’s view:
30More carefully, Lewis offers several possible roles that naturalness might play in order to
explain this data: reference magnetism is best thought of as a group of meta-semantic theories
rather than a single theory. For example, he suggests that naturalness might fix facts about cau-
sation and causation might resolves radical indeterminacy. Or, he suggests that naturalness facts
might figure in assigning mental content which can then be used to rebut radical indeterminacy
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Only an elite minority [of possible referents] are carved at the joints.... Only
these elite things and classes are eligible to serve as referents....Ceteris paribus,
an eligible interpretation is one that maximises the eligibility of referents over-
all....overall eligibility of referents is a matter of degree, making total theory come
true is a matter of degree, the two desiderata trade off. The correct, ‘intended’
interpretations are the ones that strike the best balance. Lewis (:984, 66)
According to Lewis, naturalness can explain the data by making some interpre-
tations more or less eligible in virtue of assigning more or less natural referents
to terms in the language. Then, the standard of correctness for an interpretation
consists not only in truth of theory but also eligibility.
Interestingly, after sketching his theory of reference magnetism, Lewis claims
that “The terms of trade [between truth of theory and eligibility] are vague;
that will make for moderate indeterminacy of reference; but the sensible real-
ist won’t demand perfect determinacy." Lewis (:984, 67) This last sentence is
significant for two reasons.
First: Lewis makes clear that the data he seeks to explain is not perfect
determinacy – our language is plainly not determinate. Rather the data to be
explained is that our language is not radically indeterminate. But some minor
vagueness in the at least as natural than relation allows us to avoid Putnam’s
conclusion: it may be vague which of a limited range of properties is the most
natural, but that doesn’t mean that naturalness cannot draw any determinate
distinctions between properties.
Second: Lewis acknowledges that it might be vague what counts as a correct
interpretation – that there might be vagueness in what we mean by ‘the best
balance of eligibility and truth of theory’ – and that this vagueness will induce
vagueness in reference. Reference is given by the interpretation that strikes the
best balance between eligibility and truth of theory, but if it’s vague which
of reference. In what follows, I will focus on just one of the suggested ways in which natural-
ness might play a role in fixing reference. Although it does not appear to be Lewis’s favored
view, and is surely over-simplistic, it is the meta-semantic theory that is typically associated
with reference-magnetism. For important discussions by Lewis, see his (:983a; :984; :986; :992;
:994). For various interpretations of Lewis’s discussion, see Williams (2007), Weatherson
(20:3), Schwarz (20:4), and Sider (200:a).
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interpretation strikes that balance, reference will be vague.
Lewis points to one way in which it might be vague whether an interpreta-
tion strikes the best balance between eligibility and truth of theory: we haven’t
settled how much of a gain in eligibility is required to compensate for a loss of
truth of total theory. But there are other sources of vagueness. For instance, we
haven’t settled which sentences count as ‘total theory’. And we haven’t settled
on a function from the relative naturalness of referents to degree of eligibility of
an interpretation. And, as I’ve already suggested, it’s plausible that we haven’t
settled on a way to determine relative naturalness of referents from perfect nat-
uralness. Each of these are ways in which we may not have settled the meaning
of ‘the best balance of eligibility and theory’ – ways it may be indeterminate
which interpretations strike the best balance – and can thus make for vagueness
in reference.
Themv-ersatzer merely adds one more way in which it can be vague whether
an interpretation strikes the best balance between eligibility and truth of total
theory. If we haven’t settled on which properties are perfectly natural then
there is vagueness in what makes an interpretation more or less eligible and
thus which interpretation strikes the best balance between eligibility and truth
of theory.
Suppose ‘personhood’ is vague between some properties p1, p2,... and ‘per-
fectly natural’ is vague between some predicates N1, N2,.... such that determi-
nately, personhood is perfectly natural. Because ‘perfectly natural’ is vague,
‘eligibility’ will be vague. If we measure eligibility in terms of N1, we’ll get
an interpretation that best balances truth of theory and N1-eligibility. This in-
terpretation will assign ‘person’ to the set of things that instantiate p1. More
generally, if we measure eligibility in terms of Nn, we’ll get an interpretation
that best balances truth of theory and Nn-eligibility. That interpretation will
assign ‘person’ to the set of things that instantiate pn. Because the reference of
‘person’ is given by the interpretation that strikes the best balance between eligi-
bility and truth of theory, and it’s vague which interpretation that is, reference
7:
will be vague.3:
7 Natural as Natural
When suggesting that ‘natural’ is vague, I am often met with the following
reaction:
Naturalness doesn’t seem like the sort of thing that can be vague. Properties
like baldness or tallness – properties that aren’t metaphysically deep – can be
vague. But some properties, like negative charge, are too metaphysically deep to
be vague. And naturalness, like negative charge, is also metaphysically deep – it’s
a fundamental feature of reality. So, it cannot be vague.
We can translate the above reaction into a more rigorous objection. Treating a
fundamental property as a natural property, the objector seems to be claiming
that perfect naturalness is perfectly natural. There are technical complications
with making sense of talk about the naturalness of naturalness. But let’s grant
the advocate of this objection such talk.
My opponent seems to be constructing the following argument:
A:. If ‘perfectly natural’ is vague, then perfect naturalness is not perfectly
natural
A2. Perfect naturalness is perfectly natural
A3. So: ‘perfectly natural’ is not vague.
3:Once we note the multitude of ways that it might be vague whether an interpretation
strikes the best balance between eligibility and truth of theory – besides just vagueness in the
more natural than ordering – we see that our Weatherson-inspired theory of precisifications is
not general enough. We can further generalize our Weatherson-inspired theory of precisifica-
tions as follows. For some pairs of interpretations, it’s settled that one interpretation strikes a
better balance between truth and eligibility than the other. For others pairs, it’s not settled that
one interpretation strikes a better balance between truth and eligibility – either because the at
least as good a balance relation is vague or because the two interpretations strike equally good
balances. A precisification can be thought of as any interpretation for which it is not settled
that there is an interpretation that strikes a better balance.
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Before we examine this argument, it will be helpful to note a related argu-
ment, discussed in the extant literature, that may also be used to object to my
proposal. According to my proposal, ‘perfectly natural’ is only slightly vague –
there are enough clear cases and its theoretical role sufficiently rich to imbue the
term with meaning. However, there is an argument against the hypothesis that
‘natural’ is only slightly vague which is inspired by Sider (20::) and is discussed
by Dorr and Hawthorne (20:4).
B:. If ‘perfectly natural’ is vague, then perfect naturalness is not perfectly
natural
B2. If so, the simplest definitions of perfect naturalness in terms of the per-
fectly natural properties will consist of long lists of the perfectly natural
properties, of the form ‘is the identical to P1 or is identical to P2 or is
identical to P3 or...’
B3. If so, perfect naturalness is extremely unnatural
B4. If so, ‘perfectly natural’ is horribly vague
As I mentioned above, Dorr and Hawthorne also think that ‘perfectly natu-
ral’ is indeterminate, which is why they are concerned to respond to the above
argument. They end up accepting premise (B:) (and A:) and instead end up fo-
cusing most of their attention on denying the step from premises (B3) to (B4).
I agree with Dorr and Hawthorne that the step from premise (B3) to (B4)
is deniable: it may be that ‘perfectly natural’ is extremely unnatural without
making the term horribly vague. But I think Dorr and Hawthorne focus their
attention on the wrong premise: if the opponent of vague naturalness wins
premises (B:)-(B3), the consequences would be disastrous.
Premise (B:) alone would do much to undermine the position that natu-
ralness is vague because of its role in argument (A:)-(A3). (A2) seems quite
plausible: it may be part of the theoretical role of naturalness that it is perfectly
natural. Thus, if my opponent wins premise (A:) / (B:), there is considerable
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pressure, from the very concept of naturalness, to admit that ‘perfectly natural’
cannot be vague.32
Fortunately, we do not need to accept premise (A:) / (B:). The reason that
Dorr and Hawthorne adduce for that premise is the following: if perfect nat-
uralness is perfectly natural, then it is highly magnetic, which makes it precise
(unless there is metaphysical vagueness). But this argument is simply an instance
of the reference magnetic GVAS. And it can be resolved in exactly the same way
that we resolved other instances of the GVAS. There can be several candidates
N1,N2, ... for the referent of ‘perfectly natural’ even though perfect naturalness
is perfectly natural, so long as each of the candidates applies to itself: N1 is N1
and N2 is N2, etc. And this vagueness in the meta-semantic facts would induce
vagueness in the semantic facts. On one way of specifying what we mean by ‘el-
igibility’, the interpretation that assigns the predicate ‘perfectly natural’ to the
set of properties that instantiate N1 maximizes (the balance between truth of
theory and) eligibility. On another, the interpretation that assigns the predicate
‘perfectly natural’ to the set of properties that instantiates N2 maximizes (the
balance between truth of theory and) eligibility. It’s vague which interpretation
is the correct one, thus the term ‘perfectly natural’ is vague.
The previous paragraph was merely meant to show that it’s consistent to ac-
cept that ‘perfectly natural’ is vague while simultaneously accepting that perfect
naturalness is perfectly natural. No doubt, it’s also consistent to accept that
‘perfectly natural’ is precise while simultaneously accepting that perfectly natu-
ral is perfectly natural. And those that are willing to give up one of (V:)-(V3)
need not follow the mv-ersatzer in accepting that ‘perfectly natural’ is vague.
But those that find (V:)-(V3) an attractive package of views should follow the
32With premises (B2)-(B3), premise (B:) also has the result that perfect naturalness would
be extremely unnatural. I think this would also be a significant blow to deal to a defender of
vague naturalness. That’s because I agree with Sider (20::) that taking naturalness to be highly
unnatural would rob the notion of the explanatory significance required for the the notion to
serve its role in reductive accounts of lawhood, duplication, etc. A defense of this claim is well
outside the scope of the present paper, but I just note it as a further reason to focus our attention
on premise (A:) / (B:).
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mv-ersatzer. The point of the previous paragraph is that both camps can accept
that perfect naturalness is perfectly natural.
8 Conclusion
This paper has sought to accomplish two goals. The first goal is to unify vari-
ous arguments under a single argument schema – the GVAS – and develop the
most plausible version of that schema. Instances of the schema were discovered
in a variety of philosophical disputes including debates over personal identity,
consciousness, special science properties, ethics, composition, persistence, on-
tological realism, naturalness, and metaphysical vagueness. And the instances
were used to establish rather shocking conclusions. The second goal of the pa-
per is to develop a highly general strategy for avoiding the GVAS. That strategy
was ersatz metaphysical vagueness. We demonstrated that, by taking the term
‘perfectly natural’ to be vague, we can mimic genuine metaphysical indetermi-
nacy in a way that allows us to avoid the GVAS. Because the GVAS is a popular
way to motivate genuine metaphysical vagueness, ersatz metaphysical vagueness
provides us with an unmysterious alternative to objectionable metaphysical in-
determinacy.
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Chapter 3
Ontological Deflationism, Vague
Existence, and Metaphysical
Vagueness†
The Carnapian campaign for ontological deflationism has been making a come-
back as of late. This resurgence has been led by Hirsch and Thomasson, under
the respective banners of quantifier variance and easy ontology. According to
the quantifier variantist, there are a range of possible languages with quantifier
expressions that, when completely unrestricted, have different semantic contri-
butions to the sentences in which they occur.: According to the easy ontologist,
certain ‘ontologically ampliative’ conditionals from application conditions to
the existence of something not mentioned by those application conditions have
the status of conceptual or analytic truths.
†Thanks to Mercy Corredor, Daniel Drucker, Umer Shakih and Brian Weatherson for dis-
cussion. I am especially grateful to David Manley for several discussions and for his help illumi-
nating the metaphysical picture underlying deflationism.
:A ‘quantifier expression’ is an expression that has a meaning that is similar to the English
quantifier. For example, it must obey the introduction and elimination rules for English quan-
tification. Sider adds an additional requirement for quantifier variance: none of the possible
quantifier expressions can be metaphysically distinguished, but many self-avowed quantifier vari-
antists will take this requirement to be empty (either because it’s trivial or nonsense).
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With this (admittedly sketchy) understanding of ontological deflationism,
it is a short step from the position to vague existence – that it can be vague
what exists. On both views, the extension of the quantifier is highly sensitive
to the way we decide to speak – either because there are a range of quantifier
meanings that our use is settling as the meaning of the English ‘exists’ or be-
cause we could have treated slightly different ontologically ampliative claims as
conceptual truths. But, if the quantifier is so sensitive to semantic decision, it is
plausible that there will be cases in which we are semantically undecided – cases
in which we haven’t settled how to use the word.
Indeed, deflationists frequently take this short step. This attitude is perva-
sive, for instance, in the work of Eli Hirsh2:
The possibility of quantifier variance brings with it another possibility: quantifier
vagueness. If the quantifiers in different languages can have different semantic
functions, then it may be indeterminate...precisely how the quantifier functions
in a given language. (Hirsch, 2008, :9:)
Is there a problem with vague existence? Lewis (:986) thought so. Lewis
distinguishes semantic indecision accounts of vagueness from metaphysical ac-
counts, writing:
The only intelligible account of vagueness locates it in our thought and language.
The reason it’s vague where the outback begins is not that there’s this thing, the
outback, with imprecise borders; rather there are many things, with different
borders, and nobody has been fool enough to try to enforce a choice of one
of them as the official referent of the word ‘outback’. Vagueness is semantic
indecision. (:2:)
He then argues that vague existence is inconsistent with a semantic indecision
account of vagueness. Not surprisingly, ontological deflationists are unmoved
by this last step in Lewis’s argument. Hirsch, for example, thinks that there are
multiple candidate meanings for ‘existence’ over which a linguistic community
can be semantically undecided:3
2See also Hirsch (:999, 43), Hirsch (2002, 89), Hirsch (20:4, :29).
3See also Hirsch (:999, 43), Hirsch (:999, :29), and Hirsch (2008, :9: and fn.:6). Hirsch
claims quantifier variance provides a way out of the Lewis/Sider vagueness argument for unre-
8:
I accept Lewis’s assumption that vagueness is a matter of semantic indecision.
...[W]hat is the problem Lewis is raising about the vagueness of the quantifier?
Since the meaning of a logical constant is given by its role in determining the
truth-conditions of sentences, the vagueness of the quantifier would consist in
our semantic indecision with respect to the truth-conditions of certain sentences.
(2002, 89)
Narrowly construed, Hirsch is claiming that vague quantification is consis-
tent with a semantic indecision model of vagueness. But, it’s easy to confuse
this narrow claim for a broader claim: that vague existence is not metaphysi-
cal vagueness. This broader reading is encouraged by ontological deflationists’
tendency to distance their view from anti-realism and endorse flat-footed formu-
lations of realism according to which the world and its objects are ‘independent’
of our language and thoughts. As Hirsch is careful to emphasize “Nothing is
being said here to imply the idealist view that what exists in the world depends
on our linguistic or conceptual decisions.” (2002, 7:). And Thomasson writes:
“we should not suggest that the entities...are ‘ontologically shallow’ or that their
existence is somehow to be understood in a deflationary manner." (20:5, :46).
Is this broader claim correct? Or does the ontological deflationists’ com-
mitment to vague existence commit them to metaphysical vagueness? At first
glance the answer seems obvious. And the apparent obviousness of the answer
might explain why the question hasn’t been examined. The problem is both
answers look obvious.
On the one hand, the answer looks to be obviously ‘yes’: vague existence
just is a form of metaphysical vagueness. Ontology is part of metaphysics: ob-
jects are in the world. So if our ontology is vague, then we have metaphysical
vagueness: we have vagueness in the world.
On the other hand, the answer looks to be obviously ‘no’: metaphysical
vagueness is not semantic vagueness but the source of vagueness in ‘exists’, ac-
cording to the deflationist, is semantic. According to the ontological deflation-
ist, the world is a particular way, but we are merely failing to describe that way
stricted mereological composition – even though this argument explicitly assumes a linguistic
theory of vagueness.
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in precise quantificational terms. The vagueness of our description need not be
reflected in the world.
When two opposite answers to a question both look obvious, that’s often a
sign that parties are speaking past one another – that the terms of the question
are unclear. The purpose of this paper is to (i) clarify the terms of the question
and (ii) answer it under various clarifications. Both parts of the project are
significant.
First: claims of vague existence and metaphysical vagueness are bandied
about without sufficient clarity, so offering regimented interpretations of these
claims allow us to press the claims with greater rigor in whatever dialectic they
appear.
Second: the tension in the two obvious answers is generated by the deflation-
ist’s realist ambitions. On the one had, we’ve been instructed that objects are
not ‘to be understood in a deflationary manner’. But on the other hand, we’re
told that vagueness in existence is not metaphysical because it’s merely the re-
sult of our language. If vagueness in how we use the word ‘exists’ is leading to
vagueness in the world, that seems to be a sort of anti-realism. For if vagueness
in language leads to vagueness in the world, the world is not as independent of
language as the deflationist would have us believe. Emphasizing the linguistic
source of the worldly vagueness is the only way for the deflationist to soothe
those of us who worry about unexplained radical metaphysical vagueness – but
it undercuts the view’s realism. Investigating the extent to which ontological
deflationists must endorse theses of metaphysical vagueness allows us to give a
rigorous statement to the extent of their anti-realism.
Two recurring themes will emerge in the course of our investigation.4 First:
I apply insights from debates over modality to the present inquiry. A parallel is
drawn between contingent existence and vague existence and that analogy is the
source of many of the advances presented in this paper. Second and relatedly: I
deploy higher-order logic to clarify and advance the debate.
4Both themes are inspired by the work of Timothy Williamson.
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: Characterization of Vague Existence
Consider a standard case of vague existence. Suppose that composition is re-
stricted to ordinary objects like people, tables, watches, etc. And suppose there
are some X s on a mat that are in the process of being assembled into a watch,
so that it isn’t quite clear whether they compose anything. This is an intuitive
case of vague existence: it’s vague whether the X s compose something.
With this case in mind, we can ask: what is the thesis of vague existence?
Here is an obvious response. We can regiment the claim that everything deter-
minately exists as:
(25) ∀x Í (∃y(y = x))
And the thesis of vague existence is the negation of (25).5
(26) ¬∀x Í (∃y(y = x))
(26) is equivalent to:6
Immodest Vague Existence (IVE) ∃xÏ(∃y(y = x))
Hawley (2002) considers (IVE) but ultimately rejects it, claiming that (IVE)
requires a commitment to non-existent objects. Hawley puts the worry as fol-
lows:
The thought is that to posit an object, to quantify over it or refer to it is already
to be committed to its existence. Having committed oneself to the existence of an
5Strictly speaking, the theses I survey in this paper are about indeterminate existence and
metaphysical indeterminacy rather than vague existence and metaphysical vagueness. I will fol-
low other authors in ignoring the distinction between vagueness and indeterminacy. Although
there may be special objections to vague existence and metaphysical vagueness that do not apply
to indeterminate existence and metaphysical indeterminacy (c.f. Eklund (20::)).
6Informal proof: (26) equivalent to the claim that something doesn’t definitely exist: ∃x¬Í
(∃y(y = x)). But whatever this thing is that doesn’t definitely exist, that thing doesn’t definitely
fail to exist. (Nothing definitely fails to exist: ¬∃x Í ¬(∃y(y = x))). So, this thing doesn’t
definitely exist and it doesn’t definitely fail to exist, which is the claim of (IVE).
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object – ‘there is an object...’ – it is somehow wrong then to draw back from the
commitment and claim that it is indeterminate whether the object exists....talk
of vague existence conjures up the idea of an object which somehow straddles
two domains, the existent and the non-existent. And, if there is no domain of
non-existent objects, then such straddling looks impossible, and there cannot be
vagueness in existence
Barnes (20:0a) also worries about immodest vagueness, writing:
Indeterminate existence is deeply problematic when interpreted de re. The claim
that there is some thing such that it’s indeterminate whether that thing exists is
hard, if not impossible, to make sense of...the de dicto reading is much weaker:
not that there is some thing such that it’s indeterminate whether that thing exists,
but rather that it’s indeterminate what things exist.
TheHawley/Barnes worry comes in two strengths. Sometimes, they merely
claim that we cannot accept the claim ∃xÏ(∃y(y = x)).7 Other times, they make
the stronger claim that we must accept the negation of immodest vagueness:
¬∃xÏ(∃y(y = x)).8
Presumably it’s this worry with (IVE) that leads Hawley and Barnes away
from ‘de re’ characterizations of vague existence. Although Barnes does not say
what she means by a ‘de dicto’ characterization of vague existence, she presum-
ably means something like vagueness in a counting sentence, restricted by some
appropriate non-vague predicate F in a suitable language. Inspired by van In-
wagen (:990), Hawley contrasts (IVE) with her preferred formulation, modest
vague existence:
Modest Vague Existence (MVE) Existence is vague just in case ðÏ(∃xF x) ∧
¬Í (∃xÏ(F x)ñ is true for some predicate F in a suitable language.
7In support of this weak reading, note that Hawley makes statements like: “If there are no
non-existent objects for quantifiers to range over, then we cannot claim immodestly that there
is an object which is such that it is indeterminate whether that object instantiates [the first
order property] existence.” (:38) and “to embrace immodest vagueness we must countenance
non-existent objects" (:38).
8In support of this stronger reading note that Hawley makes claims like: “Without non-
existent objects, there are no borderline cases of existence, even if there is modest vague exis-
tence.” (:38) and “if there is no domain of non-existent objects, then such straddling looks
impossible, and there cannot be vagueness in existence” (:35). It’s not clear which strength
Barnes is endorsing.
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These alternative characterizations of vague existence strike me as baroque
and, in virtue of their appeal to predicates, objectionably language-dependent.
But, like Hawley and Barnes, I also do not think that (IVE) is the best charac-
terization of vague existence. Fortunately, I disagree with their reasons: de re
vague existence neither requires non-existent objects nor is it nonsense. Instead,
my preferred statement of vague existence is (VE):
Vague Existence (VE) ¬Í (∀x Í (∃y(y = x)))
(VE) is weaker than (IVE). It doesn’t claim that there is an object that in-
determinately exists; rather it claims that we cannot rule out such an object.
Note, however, that (VE), like (IVE), involves the sort of de re vague existence
that Hawley and Barnes reject. And the Hawley/Barnes worry for de re char-
acterizations of vague existence like (IVE) would also infect my preferred char-
acterization (VE). For suppose the strong worry with (IVE) is correct. That
is, suppose we know the negation of (IVE): ¬∃xÏ(∃y(y = x)). Then we would
know that everything definitely exists: ∀x Í (∃y(y = x)).9 If we know p, then
it’s definitely the case that p. So, we have Í (∀x Í (∃y(y = x))) which con-
tradicts (VE). So it’s important for our purposes to see why their criticism is
off-track.
It’s helpful at this point to turn to a modal analogue. Note how similar
(VE) and (IVE) are to statements of contingentism in a language with modal
operators. (I take this as further reason to prefer (VE) over (MVE).) And just
as contingentism does not involve positing merely possible objects, immodest
vague existence involves no commitment to non-existent objects.
My watch exists. And it has several properties, including the property of
being a watch. But my watch could have failed to exist. So, it has the prop-
erty of possibly not existing: λx(◊¬∃y(y = x)). Consider the modal parallel to
the Hawley/Barnes complaint against immodest vague existence applied to my
9Informal proof: If nothing indeterminately exists, then everything is such that it either
determinately exists or determinately fails to exist. But nothing determinately fails to exist. So,
everything determinately exists.
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watch: to posit an object, my watch, is already to be committed to the watch’s exis-
tence. Having committed to the watch’s existence, it is somehow wrong then to draw
back and claim that it is contingent whether the watch exists; such talk conjures up
the idea of an object which somehow straddles two domains, the actual existent and
the merely-possible existent.
This complaint is simply wrongheaded – contingentists can retain their seri-
ous actualist credentials, at least in the face of the present criticism. The watch
(actually) exists, so we can quantify over it. And we can predicate all sorts of
properties to the watch. Just as we can predicate the property of being a watch
to the watch, we can predicate the property of possible non-existence. At no
point are we quantifying over non-existent objects or attributing properties to
something that does not exist. And that’s true regardless of which property –
being a watch or possibly not existing – we predicate of the watch.
Compare our guiding case of vague existence in which some watch parts
X have come together to an intermediate degree, such that it’s indeterminate
whether they compose a watch. Consider the following sentence:
(27) There is a watch composed of the watch parts
Now plainly, (27) is not assertable. And its unassertability isn’t mysterious.
The following conditionals are definitely true:
(28) If there is something which the watch parts compose, then there is a watch
composed of the watch parts
(29) If there is nothing which the watch parts compose, then it’s not the case
that there is a watch composed of the watch parts.
But it’s indeterminate which antecedent of the above conditionals is true. So it’s
indeterminate whether there is a watch composed of the watch parts. So, (27)
is indeterminate. Simply put: since (27) depends on whether the watch parts
compose, and it’s indeterminate whether the watch parts compose, (27) will be
indeterminate.
87
Of course, then, (27) is unassertable: sentences that are indeterminate are
not assertable – just like the sentence ‘Harry is bald’ is unassertable when Harry
is a borderline case of baldness. And it’s natural to treat the negation of an in-
determinate sentence as indeterminate – this, for example, is true for superval-
uationists and allows them to explain why the sentence “Harry is not bald” is
also unassertable. So, the sentence
(30) It’s not the case that there is a watch composed of the watch parts
may also be indeterminate. The same story applies to any predicate F for which
the conditionals:
(3:) If there is something which the watch parts compose, then there is an F
composed of the watch parts
(32) If there is nothing which the watch parts compose, then it’s not the case
that there is an F composed of the watch parts.
are assertable. In such a case, the sentence
(33) There is an F composed of the watch parts
will be indeterminate. And, plausibly, so will its negation:
(34) It’s not the case that there is an F composed of the watch parts
The same is true of a predicate of indeterminate existence. Hawley and
Barnes are right that we cannot say that there is an indeterminately existing
object composed of the watch parts. But this has nothing to do with the fact that
we are predicating indeterminate existence rather than some other property.
It’s not that indeterminate existence requires non-existent objects. Rather it’s
because it’s indeterminate whether there is an object composed of the watch
parts to instantiate the property of indeterminate existence. If the watch parts
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do compose, there is an object composed of the watch parts that indeterminately
exists. If the watch parts do not compose, there is not an object composed of
the watch parts that indeterminately exists. Since whether there is an object
composed of the watch parts that indeterminately exists depends on whether the
watch parts compose, and it’s indeterminate whether the watch parts compose,
it’s indeterminate whether there is an object composed of the watch parts that
indeterminately exists.
Even the weak version of the Hawley/Barnes complaint fails. We can see
this by reflecting on what I will call Joint Vague Existence ( JVE) cases. JVE cases
can be described roughly as ones in which we have two cases of vague existence
but they are joined so that existence occurs in at least one of the two cases.
Imagine the following case: there are some X s and some Y s such that (i) it’s
indeterminate whether the X s compose and (ii) it’s indeterminate whether the
Y s compose but (iii) determinately either the X s compose or the Y s compose.:0
A bit less abstractly: imagine God is creating the world and arranges some X s
catwise and, some distance away, some Y s catwise and declares that there is
one cat but says nothing as to whether or not the X s or the Y s form the cat.
Even less abstractly, some three-dimensionalist believes that when caterpillars
go out of existence a new object – a butterfly – comes into existence (and the
two objects never exist simultaneously). In these cases, there will be a time
where (if we are presentists), it may be vague which of the objects (caterpillar
or butterfly) exists.
In each of these cases, (IVE) is assertable. Consider the final case: it’s in-
determinate whether the caterpillar exists or whether the butterfly exists. But,
because it’s determinate that one of the objects exists, it’s determinate that one
of the objects will have the property of indeterminate existence (even though
it’s indeterminate which has this property). I take this to undermine even the
weak form of the Hawley/Barnes worry: we can assert (IVE) without positing
:0And, it’s not the case that there is something that definitely exists such that’s indeterminate
whether it is composed of the X s or the Y s.
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non-existent objects.
Thus, in some cases of vague existence, (IVE) is assertable and determinate.
In other cases, (IVE) is indeterminate. What these cases have in common, how-
ever, is that we cannot rule out (IVE). More carefully: in all of these cases, it’s
not determinate that there is not something that indeterminately exists:
(35) ¬Í (¬∃xÏ(∃y(y = x))
We can put the point more simply in terms of determinate existence. In
special cases of vague existence – like JVE cases – it’s not the case that everything
definitely exists. But in all cases of vague existence, it’s not definitely the case
that everything definitely exists, which is my preferred formulation, (VE).
2 Negative Characterizations of Metaphysical Vague-
ness
We opened by asking whether vague existence requires metaphysical vagueness
but noted that the question was not well-posed. With our statement of vague
existence as (VE), we are now in a position to ask our question in clearer terms:
does (VE) require metaphysical vagueness?
As we saw, if ontological deflationism is correct, it’s tempting to conclude
that the answer is obviously ‘no’. (VE) might be true as a result of semantic
vagueness. But semantic vagueness is not metaphysical vagueness. In this sec-
tion, I’ll argue that the motivating question is not so easily dismissed.
Proponents of the ‘obviously no’ answer to the opening question seem to be
gesturing at a negative characterization of metaphysical vagueness made popular
by Barnes (20:0b). Her negative characterization of metaphysical vagueness is
motivated by the simple idea that if there is vagueness and it’s neither semantic
nor epistemic, then it must be metaphysical:
vagueness has three potential sources – how we represent the world (representa-
tional or semantic vagueness), the limits of our knowledge of the world (epistemic
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vagueness), or the way the world is in and of itself (ontic vagueness). [...] So if
we know that there’s (non-epistemic) indeterminacy and we know that our rep-
resentations are wholly blameless, then we can conclude that the source of the
indeterminacy is the world itself. (603-4)
Call this the exclusion test. Barnes takes the exclusion test to justify her official
characterization of metaphysical vagueness:
(MV) Sentence S is metaphysically vague iff: were all representational content
precisified, there is an admissible precisification of S such that according
to that precisification the sentence would still be non-epistemically inde-
terminate in a way that is Sorites-susceptible.::
If (MV) is true, then vague existence does not entail metaphysical vagueness,
given the possibility of ontological deflationism. If existence is vague because
we haven’t settled on one among many candidate meanings for the quantifier,
then if we were to precisify the ‘representational content’ of the quantifier – if
we were to settle on one of the candidate meanings – then there would be no
more indeterminacy in the quantifier. Thus, by (MV), (VE) is compatible with
the absence of metaphysical vagueness.
The tempting conclusion, however, relies on (MV) being an adequate state-
ment of metaphysical vagueness. But it is not. Modulo concerns with our grip
of Barnes’ talk of ‘sources’ of vagueness, the exclusion test is plausible: if we can
rule out non-metaphysical sources of vagueness, we are left with metaphysical
vagueness. Unfortunately, the exclusion test only gives us a sufficient condition
for metaphysical vagueness. (MV), on the other hand, attempts to give us nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for metaphysical vagueness.
The exclusion test cannot serve as a necessary condition for metaphysical
vagueness because a sentence can have sources of vagueness which are both
metaphysical and non-metaphysical. It may seem as though (MV) can accom-
modate such cases, and thus can extend the exclusion test to a full analysis of
::Barnes uses the word ‘ontic vagueness’ rather than ‘metaphysical vagueness’ but I don’t
think the different is relevant. Barnes (20:0b, 604)
9:
metaphysical vagueness. The strategy underlying (MV) is to first eliminate non-
metaphysical sources of vagueness and check if any vagueness remain. Accord-
ing to this underlying strategy: vagueness remains just in case the original sen-
tence was metaphysically vague to begin with.
This strategy, however, is misguided. It is neither a necessary nor suffi-
cient condition of metaphysical vagueness that vagueness remains after seman-
tic vagueness is removed. It not sufficient: removing semantic vagueness may
generate new metaphysical vagueness. More problematic for our purposes, it is
not necessary. If semantic vagueness is generating metaphysical vagueness, then
removing the semantic vagueness may also remove metaphysical vagueness. If
metaphysical vagueness is generating semantic vagueness, removing semantic
vagueness may require us to remove its metaphysical source. Or metaphysical
and semantic vagueness may have a common source that must be removed in
order to remove the semantic vagueness. Or perhaps a single source can both be
classified as semantic and metaphysical. This is not merely a complaint about
Barnes’ use of counterfactuals to regiment talk of ‘sources’ of vagueness. Coun-
terfactual analyses of dependence relations are notoriously fraught, but my com-
plaint is targeting the strategy that is underlying the counterfactual analysis: that
strategy assumes that metaphysical and non-metaphysical sources of vagueness
are largely independent of one another.
To make the point less abstract, consider Merricks’ (200:) argument that se-
mantic vagueness generates metaphysical vagueness.:2 Suppose our term ‘bald’
suffers from semantic indecision so that we haven’t decided whether Harry falls
under its extension. Then the sentences (i) ‘Harry is bald’ and (ii) “Bald’ has
the property describing Harry’ are both vague. And, according to Merricks,
the second sentence ismetaphysically vague because it’s vague whether an object
(the word ‘bald’) has a property (the property of describing Harry). This would
be a case in which semantic indecision is generating metaphysical vagueness but
:2See also Taylor and Burgess (20:5) for the claim that semantic indeterminacy brings meta-
physical indeterminacy.
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(MV) fails to count this as a case of metaphysical vagueness. Were all repre-
sentational content precisified, the sentence “Bald’ has the property describing
Harry’ would no longer be vague. I don’t wish to suggest that Merricks’ argu-
ment is a good one: ultimately I think Merricks’ argument fails:3. And perhaps
we can modify (MV) in a way that accommodates the metaphysical vagueness
he envisions. Rather the suggestion is more general: metaphysical and non-
metaphysical sources of vagueness may not be as independent as (MV) would
have us imagine and we should not rule out this possibility by fiat.
The worry I am raising is particularly relevant for the investigation of this
paper. We are seeking to understand whether or not ontological deflationists’
commitment to vague existence requires them to accept metaphysical vague-
ness. But ontological deflationists tend to put pressure on the independence
of the metaphysical from the semantic. It’s hard to make that last claim pre-
cise and any deflationist worth their salt will try to accommodate the claim
of independence on some readings (for example, deflationists deny that what
exists modally depends (in a radical way) on our language). Nevertheless, we
should be suspicious of characterizations of metaphysical vagueness that ignore
the possibility of such dependencies.
***
We cannot so quickly conclude that (VE) is consistent with the absence
of metaphysical vagueness because (MV) is a flawed analysis of metaphysical
vagueness, especially in the context of ontologically deflationary views. Unfor-
tunately, I have no alternative analysis of ‘metaphysical vagueness’ to offer.
I think the term ‘metaphysical vagueness’ is a bit like the term ‘realism’.
Some choose to regiment claims of realism in terms of excluded middle and bi-
valence. Others regiment such claims in terms of fundamentality, grounding,
structure, or truth-making. Still others understand realism in modal terms. Per-
haps there is an important debate about which characterization really captures
:3SeeWeatherson (2003, 500-50:).
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the claim of realism (although I am skeptical) and perhaps that debate will even-
tually be settled. Until then, however, we are best off just understanding the
regimentations in their own terms. Then, instead of asking whether a position
is realist simpliciter, we can ask whether a position conforms to a particular
regimented thesis that is supposed to capture a particular sort of realism.
I adopt the same methodology with respect to metaphysical vagueness. I’ll
survey a range of theses that seem to capture some sense of metaphysical vague-
ness and the slogan ‘vagueness in the world’.:4 We’ll try to understand those
theses on their own terms. And then we can ask whether or not (VE) entails
or violates those theses. If we can come to understand the metaphysical im-
port of the thesis under discussion, we can explore the consequences of vague
existence on our picture of reality, without delving into verbal disputes about
applications of the label ‘metaphysical vagueness’.
Of course, many will treat (VE) itself as an interesting sort of metaphysical
vagueness – which is why some found the answer to the opening question so
obvious. Of course, the deflationist will explain (VE) as resulting from our
language. But, as I’ve pointed out, this is in tension with her insistence that
what exists in the world is ‘independent’ of language. In order to see the full
extent to which the deflationist must admit that vagueness in language results in
worldly vagueness, we’ll continue to explore alternative ways of capturing the
notion of metaphysical vagueness.
3 Fuzzy Set Theory
It might be thought that fuzzy sets are a way that the world can be vague:
:4One sort of metaphysical vagueness that I won’t explore here can be stated in terms of
metaphysical fundamentality. Roughly put: fundamental vagueness is a sort of metaphysical
vagueness. Borrowing the apparatus of Sider (20::) in which we can talk about a fundamental
language, we can put the thesis as follows: if the determinacy operator is part of the fundamental
language we have a sort of metaphysical vagueness. It’s not clear, however, how vague existence
would require fundamental vagueness. See Chapter 2 for relevant discussion.
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Fuzzy Sets (FS) ∃x∃yÏ(x ∈ y)
Perhaps we can construct an argument that vague existence entails (FS). Hawley
(2002) attempts to show just this:
If there is vagueness in what things the world contains, this might be thought to
entail vague identity among sets. For example, consider the set of the simples,
P [‘P ’ names the plurality of simples], which are the candidate-composers of the
unhealthy [vaguely existing] hamster: call this set ‘SP ’. Now consider the set
of the things on the mat, SH . If the hamster were determinately dead, then,
according to van Inwagen, P would be the only things on the mat. If the hamster
were determinately alive, then the things on the mat would be P plus the hamster.
This suggests that in the indeterminate situation, it is indeterminate whether SP
is identical to SH . (:32-:33)
Hawley worries that this sort of indeterminacy would violate the conclusion
of the Evans-Salmon argument against vague identity, and so suggests a modifi-
cation of the Extensionality Principle of set identity according to which “Sets
can be determinately distinct without determinately differing in their member-
ship, just so long as it is indeterminate whether they differ in their member-
ship.” (:33) On this modification, SP and SH are (determinately) distinct.:5
(FS) is a radical claim. But, it’s not clear that it does much to capture a
sense of metaphysical vagueness. That’s because it’s not clear that the term ‘∈’
isn’t vague in the way terms like ‘smarter than’ are vague. Admittedly, ‘∈’ is a
different sort of term from ‘smarter than’: it’s a quasi-logical theoretical term.
Perhaps this can form the basis for thinking that the vagueness is different in
kind from the more mundane sorts of vagueness in terms like ‘smarter than’.:6
Fortunately, we don’t need to answer these questions in order to understand
the ramification of (VE) and ontological deflationism. That’s because Hawley’s
argument that vague existence requires vague set membership is fallacious – even
spotting her the cogency of the Evans-Salmon argument.
:5Hawley does not endorse vague existence or (FS), only the claim that if there is vague
existence then there will be vagueness in set membership.
:6For instance, it might be subject to a reference magnetic GVAS of the sort examined in
Chapter 2.
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Note first that not all vague identity statements run afoul of the Evans-
Salmon argument. As Thomason (:982) and Lewis (:988) have pointed out, the
Evans-Salmon argument rules out:
(36) ∃x∃yÏ(x = y)
It does not, however, rule out:
(37) Ï(a = b )
so long as (37) doesn’t entail the problematic (36). And that entailment is deni-
able if the singular terms ‘a’ and ‘b ’ are vague.
Hawley thinks that the conclusion Ï(SP = SH ) runs afoul of the Evans-
Salmon argument and, for this reason, gives up Extensionality. She is, however,
aware of the Lewis/Thomason observation that, if the singular terms flanking
the identity statement are vague, statements of vague identity don’t run afoul of
the Evan-Salmon argument. Presumably, she suspects that in the case of vague
existence described, the terms ‘SP ’ and ‘SH ’ are not vague. Let’s explain that
suspicion by considering a modal analogue to the case.
Suppose with van Inwagen that composition only occurs when simples form
a living organism. Suppose further that there are some simples G on the mat
and those simples are arranged hamster-wise and compose a hamster. It’s also
possible that those simples are arranged otherwise on the mat and do not com-
pose anything. Let ‘	(S)’ be short for ‘¬(S)∧¬(¬S)’; so 	(S) says that it’s
contingent whether S. In this case, we can say:
(38) 	(the set containing the Gs = the set containing everything on the mat)
Clearly, we cannot infer that there is contingent identity: ∃x∃y 	 (x = y).
That’s because it is contingent what the definite descriptions refer to. It’s possi-
ble that they refer to the same thing; it’s also possible that they refer to distinct
things. Moreover, because the existence of a hamster composed of G is con-
tingent, the existence of any set containing such a hamster is also contingent
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(assuming that set contain their members essentially). Contingent existence
begets contingent existence.
A parallel response is available to the proponent of vague existence. We
cannot infer the problematic (36) from Ï(SP = SH ). The name ‘SP ’ was in-
troduced as the set of simples on the mat and the name ‘SH ’ was introduced
as the set of everything on the mat. But it’s indeterminate what the definite
description ‘the set containing everything on the mat’ refers to: it may refer to
the set of simples on the mat, or, if such a set exists, it may refer to a set contain-
ing some simples and a hamster. It’s not determinately the case that it and the
definite description ‘the set of simples on the mat’ refer to distinct things. Nor
is it determinately the case that they refer to the same thing. Because it’s vague
whether there exists something other than the simples on the mat, it’s vague
whether ‘SP ’ and ‘SH ’ refer to the same object or not. Moreover, because the
existence of a hamster is vague, the existence of any set containing such a ham-
ster is also vague. Vague existence of members begets vague existence of sets.
4 The Modal Analogy and De Re Vagueness
In order to focus our efforts on extracting senses of metaphysical vagueness, we
can continue to exploit the modal analogy. The world and its properties are
infused with modality in a way that (if there is no metaphysical vagueness) the
world and its properties are not infused with vagueness. What, however, is the
way that the world and its properties are infused with modality?
One way in which the world and its properties are infused with modality
is that objects are subject to de re modal properties. In Quine’s (:953) terms,
objects are subject to the third grade of modal involvement. On this proposal,
the world is infused with contingency in case we can find some formula φ free
in z such that:
De Re Contingency ð∃x(λz(◊φz)xñ
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The analogous suggestion is that the world is infused with indeterminacy in
case:
De Re Indeterminacy (DRI) ð∃x(λz(Ïφz)xñ
Sainsbury (:994) considers this proposal for capturing the claim that the
world is vague and correctly rejects it:
It is hard to see how one could prevent a thesis of ontic vagueness based on
[(DRI)] entailing that every borderline case is a vague object. Suppose this ripen-
ing tomato is a borderline for ‘red’. Then it is vague whether or not this is red.
Why is not the corresponding statement, in which the vagueness operator is im-
ported so as to have narrow scope, also true? That is, why is it not also true
that λz(Ï(redz) this? If it is, then this tomato counts as a vague object merely
because it is a borderline case for ‘red’; a result which...ensures that we do not
have a thesis of ontic vagueness.
Sainsbury’s point here is simple. Suppose it’s indeterminate whether Harry
is bald. Then, supposing that the name ‘Harry’ isn’t vague, Harry will be a
borderline case of baldness. That is, Harry is indeterminately bald. So, there
is something that is indeterminately bald – namely Harry. Thus, any view
that accepts the existence of borderline cases must admit (DRI), but surely we
can admit borderline cases without being committed to worldly indeterminacy!
(DRI) doesn’t capture an interesting sense of worldly indeterminacy.
Sainsbury uses this observation to question another prominent characteri-
zation of metaphysical indeterminacy, put forth by Michael Tye. According to
Tye, there is metaphysical indeterminacy if
(39) ∃xλy∃z(Ï(y is part of z))x
More simply, there is metaphysical indeterminacy if there is an object that is in-
determinately part of another object – a borderline case of parthood. But Sains-
bury’s observation undermines the prima facie plausibility of this definition:
just as we can give non-metaphysical accounts of borderline cases of baldness
according to which (let’s say) we haven’t settled the meaning of ‘bald’, we can
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give a non-metaphysical account of borderline cases of parthood according to
which (let’s say) we haven’t settled the meaning of ‘part’. Absent some reason
to think that such an account won’t apply to ‘part’, we are left wondering why
(39) would give us a case of metaphysical vagueness.
Is there some reason to think that whatever account applies to ‘bald’ cannot
apply to ‘part’? Is there some reason to think that (39) is a special sort of
metaphysical vagueness? In response to Sainsbury, Tye (2000) gives two such
reasons, neither of which is persuasive. First, he argues:
Having a possible borderline case...is not a sufficient condition for a predicate’s
being vague. So long as the predicate does not have a meaning that precludes
its being satisfied by precise objects, what is needed, I suggest, for a necessary
and sufficient condition is the possibility of a borderline case involving precise
objects. (200)
Because ‘part’ cannot have borderline cases involving precise objects, the predi-
cate ‘part’ cannot be vague according to Tye’s criterion. So, if there is vagueness
in parthood, it must not be from the vagueness of the predicate but must instead
be metaphysical.
It’s not clear that metaphysical accounts of vague parthood are consistent
with the predicate ‘part’ not being vague – the predicate will be vague, even if
the vagueness is metaphysical. But even setting this worry aside, Tye’s argument
is clearly question begging. Tye takes a precise object to be one that has only de-
terminate parts. But in so far as one thinks that ‘part’ can be non-metaphysically
vague, they will clearly reject Tye’s criterion, which has no independent plausi-
bility. Tye’s second argument is no better.
...every object is a part of itself. If this is so, then there cannot be an object such
that it is indeterminate whether it is a part of itself, even if some objects, actual
or possible, are vague. Where a relational term is vague, it has possible borderline
cases in which a single object is related to itself – provided that the term’s meaning
permits it to have non-borderline cases of application of this sort....It follows
again that ‘part of’ is not vague. (200)
This second proposed criterion for a predicate’s being vague not only lacks in-
dependent plausibility: it is positively implausible. Consider the predicate is
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at least as smart as or or is smarter than or identical to. Clearly, that predicate
is vague, yet there are no possible borderline cases in which a single object is
related to itself: everyone is at least as smart as themselves.
The best proposal for arguing against non-metaphysical accounts of vague-
ness in ‘part’ is to link vague parthood to vague existence and argue that vague
existence is a sort of metaphysical vagueness.:7 The second step of that argument
is, of course, exactly what is being investigated in this paper.:8
5 Vague Properties and the Problem of the Many
Properties
After noticing that (DRI) fails to capture an interesting sense of metaphysi-
cal vagueness, Sainsbury gives up the modal analogue for formulating theses of
metaphysical vagueness.:9 He continues his exploration for a thesis of meta-
physical vagueness without this analogy, exploring in particular the thesis that
there are vague properties. Unfortunately, the project of articulating the thesis
of vague properties ultimately frustrates him.
Can we do better? The slogan that we are trying to capture is: if there is
no metaphysical vagueness, then properties themselves aren’t vague, even if our
predicates are. But what is a precise property? A misguided attempt can make
the slogan look as hopeless as (DRI).20 It might be thought:
A property like having at least 50,000 hairs is (or approaches something like) a
precise property, while a property like baldness is a vague property. We can see
this because, in mundane cases of vagueness without e.g. vague existence, the
:7For more on the link between vagueness in parthood and vagueness in existence, see Sider
(200:, §4.9)
:8Another proposal treats parthood as a reference magnet and thus not apt for semantic
indecision accounts. Applying the exclusion test, we can conclude that vagueness in ‘part’ is
metaphysical. I discuss this style of argument in Chapter 2.
:9He goes on to explore a refinement of the test according to which the world is vague in
case we can find a sharp predicate φ for which (DRI) is true but worries about finding a way of
defining ‘sharp predicate’ in a way that does not trivialize the thesis.
20Sainsbury (:994) also expresses the concern below, but does not offer the solution I do.
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predicate ‘bald’ is a vague one in that we can say: ∃xÏ(Baldx) – or at least there
are possible worlds in which this is true. But ∃xÏ(having less than 50,000 hairsx)
isn’t true at any possible world.2: So, if there is a property baldness, there is a
vague property.
But, this way of capturing the slogan looks hopeless, because of course there is
a property of baldness. Surely there are people who are bald. And from the
obviously true conditional ‘if someone is bald, then someone has the property
baldness’, we can conclude that there is a property of baldness. So, there are
vague properties.
The only option for avoiding this trivialization is to deny the ‘obviously
true’ conditional. And indeed, many ‘hardcore’ ontologists who find the ex-
istence of properties a substantive question will deny that the conditional is
obviously true. But, it looks quite plausible that the conditional is true – even if
not obviously so. Even if the proposed test doesn’t entirely trivialize the thesis
of metaphysical vagueness, it makes the thesis as plausible as the overwhelm-
ingly plausible conditional. And, presumably, opponents of this instance of the
de-nominalizing conditional will oppose all instances of the conditional. For
these nominalists the fact that there are no vague properties is a uninteresting
consequence of the more general fact that there are no properties. But moving
to nominalism is patently dodging the question of metaphysically vague prop-
erties.
Reflecting on the above failure to cash out this understanding of vague prop-
erties yields two lessons. First: the issue of metaphysically vague properties
seems orthogonal to the realism/nominalism debate over property ontology.
Speaking roughly, the claim that there are metaphysically vague properties has
two parts: (i) that there are properties and (ii) that these properties are meta-
physically vague. It’s the second part that we are interested in. The claim that
there are metaphysically vague properties should have a nominalist analogue
2:As Sainsbury (:994) points out, defining a predicate as precise or vague will require modal
notions. One problem with this use of modal notions in an attempt to define metaphysical
vagueness is that it makes the thesis of metaphysical vagueness necessary. But one may think
that metaphysical vagueness is merely possible. I won’t discuss this problem further.
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that doesn’t presuppose the existence of properties and that can be understood
and debated by realists and nominalists alike.
Second: the strategy for distinguishing precise and vague properties ties
predicates too closely with the properties they stand for. This should raise
alarms: whether a predicate is vague is a linguistic matter whereas whether a
property is vague is a metaphysical matter. Recall the slogan we are trying to
capture: properties aren’t vague, even if our predicates are. From the perspec-
tive of a theorist that endorses this slogan, a predicate can be vague even if there
are only precise properties if it’s vague which precise property that predicate
picks out. Suppose borderline cases for the predicate ‘bald’ are limited to those
with either 50,000 or 50,00: hairs on their head. From this perspective, there
are precise properties like having less than 50,000 hairs on your head, having less
than 50,00: hairs on your head, etc.22 And the property of baldness isn’t some
distinct property over and above any of these precise properties. Rather, it’s
vague which of these precise properties is picked out by the name ‘baldness’.
Similarly for the complex properties of (DRI) defined by λ-abstraction using
the indeterminacy operators. The property of being indeterminately bald isn’t
some metaphysically strange property – it’s just the property of having either
50,000 or 50,00: hairs.
This approach parallels a popular solution to the Problem of the Many that
denies metaphysically vague objects.23 On this solution, Kilimanjaro isn’t some
distinct object over and above the various candidate-mountains with precise
borders. Rather the term ‘Kilimanjaro’ vaguely refers to one of these precise
candidate-mountains. According to this solution: ¬∃x Í (x = k) (there isn’t
something that is definitely Kilimanjaro). We can express the analogous idea for
the property of baldness (symbolized as B ). And, we can nominalize the idea by
using second-order logic with primitive quantification into predicate position.
The claim that there isn’t some property that is definitely baldness can be writ-
22For exposition purposes, I am assuming that there is no vagueness in the attribution of this
property.
23See Lewis (:993).
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ten as: ¬∃X Í (X ≡ B) (where ‘≡’ expresses (something like) identity for the
nominalized properties).
6 Vague Properties and the Return of the Modal
Analogy
We’ve seen that the strategy of defining vague properties as the properties re-
ferred to by vague predicates fails, because a vague predicate can vaguely refer
to a property we intuitively think of as precise. How then do we define a vague
property? Sainsbury gives up the modal analogy prematurely: the modal anal-
ogy is fruitful in formulating a thesis of metaphysically vague properties. Our
properties are infused with modality in a way that, if there is no metaphysical
vagueness, they are not infused with vagueness. Properties have a modal dimen-
sion to them: it’s contingent which objects instantiate these properties. We can
put that idea more carefully as follows:
Modality of Properties (MP) ◊(∃X∃x((X x)∧◊(∃Y ((Y ≡X )∧ (¬Y x))))
Indeed, we may want to go so far as to include the following comprehension
schema for (monadic) properties:24
Strong Modal Comprehension (SMC) ∃X∀x(X x↔φ)
where φ can be substituted for any formula not free in X and the resulting in-
stance of the schema can be prefixed with any number of universal quantifiers
and necessity operators. (SMC) ensures that properties have a modal dimension
to them. For example, we can substitute the formula ‘is five feet from a banana’
forφ; the resulting instance would guarantee the existence of a property that ap-
plies at world w to all and only objects that are five feet from a banana in world
24This is a major piece of Williamson’s (20:3) argument for necessitism.
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w. Given that different things can be five feet from a banana, the property’s
intension will vary and (MP) will be satisfied.25
(MP) captures the idea that properties are infused with modality – that prop-
erties have a modal dimension. Following the modal analogy reveals an obvious
way to distinguish precise and vague properties. A property is precise if it defi-
nitely applies to the same things – if, wherever the property exists, it is has the
same extension. Properties infused with vagueness – properties with a determi-
nacy dimension to them –make for a sort of metaphysical vagueness. The claim
that definitely there are no metaphysically vague properties can be expressed as
follows:
No Indeterminacy of Properties (NIP) Í (∀X∀x(X x →Í ((∃Y (Y ≡ X ))→
X x)))
Now, a proponent of vague existence that is attempting to avoid metaphysi-
cal vagueness need not accept the vagueness analogue of (SMC)
Strong Vague Comprehension (SVC) ∃X Í ∀x(X x↔φ)
Instead, they can accept a weaker comprehension schema
Weak Vague Comprehension (WVC) ∃X∀x(X x↔φ)
Unlike (SVC), (WVC) does not guarantee violations of (NIP). Rather, (WVC)
only guarantees that there is a property for every extension, but is silent on
whether that property has that extension definitely or indefinitely. Thus, it is
25Williamson also claims that Strong Modal Comprehension establishes higher-order neces-
sitism – that is, necessarily all properties necessarily exist. I disagree: if properties are individ-
uated more fine-grainedly than their intensions, (SMC) does not establish higher-order neces-
sitism. This is my preferred response to Williamson’s argument for (first-order) necessitism. We
can accept that necessarily there is a property that has the intension of my haecceity without
admitting that my haecceity necessarily exists. SeeWilliamson (20:3, 264-266) and Fritz and
Goodman (20:6).
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consistent with (WVC) that properties, where they exist, have their extensions
definitely.26
With yet another clear statement of one sort of metaphysical vagueness, we can
ask: does vague existence violate (NIP)? It does not, but avoiding violations of
(NIP) reveals some interesting consequences for vague existence.
The following constraint is intuitive:27
Being (B) ∀X∀x Í (X x→∃y(y = x))
In English: every property and everything is such that it’s determinate that,
if that thing has that property then that thing is something. I don’t have an
argument, per se, for this principle. Yet, I take this principle to be about as
obvious as any metaphysical principle: I simply can’t see how something can
have a property – can be a certain way – without existing. Similarly for the
modal version of the thesis, which is sometimes called the claim of Serious
Actualism.
Now suppose it’s vague whether some X s on a mat compose something.
Determinately, if the X s compose some y then y will have a great number of
properties. But those properties cannot definitely apply to the same things. By
(B), the property cannot definitely apply to y because y doesn’t definitely exist.
So, we have an apparent violation of (NIP).
Recall, (NIP) only demanded that properties have the same extension if
they exist. The above argument rests on the assumption that (definitely) all
26Note that the argument that Williamson (20:3) puts forth in favor of (SMC) does not
apply to (SVC). Roughly: he argues that (SMC) is the best explanation for the fact that there
is a property for every extension and some varying intensions. But in the vagueness analog,
we need not accept that any varying ‘intensions’ have corresponding properties. Although I
don’t explore it here, Williamson’s argument may be exploited for an interesting conclusion.
For those that admit some indeterminacy in properties, in the sense that some properties have
a determinacy dimension to them, there is abductive pressure for them to accept (SVC). And
(SVC) might be used to argue against (VE) in the same way Williamson uses (SMC) to argue
against contingent existence. Thus violations of (NIP) may rule out (VE).
27SeeWilliamson (20:3) and Fine (:985) for a discussion of the modal version of this princi-
ple.
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properties definitely exist. A proponent of vague existence need not accept this
claim. They may simply deny that properties definitely exist. Then: definitely
for any object that indeterminately exists, if there are any properties that apply
to that object, those properties also indeterminately exist.
This is yet another case in which vague existence begets vague existence. In
order to avoid metaphysical vagueness, deflationists that posit vagueness in first-
order quantification must admit that higher-order quantifiers can also be vague.
This is a more significant result than it may first appear. Consider the sorts of
properties that would apply to the composite of the X s, if that composite exists.
Presumably, the property of being self-identical is one such property. And if the
X s are arranged as a hamster in the process of dying, the property of being a
hamster is another. In order to dodge violations of (NIP), the proponent of
(VE) must accept that, of the properties being self-identical and being a hamster,
those properties don’t determinately exist. Thus, deflationists must not only
admit vagueness in existence; they must also either accept metaphysically vague
properties or vagueness in the existence of a great number of properties. Both
options, however, look like radical results. The deflationist must try to explain
this apparently radical consequence of their view by pointing to its source in the
vagueness of language. That might help us swallow the results, but undermines
the extent of the ontological deflationists’ realist ambitions.
7 Vague States of Affairs
Return once more to the modal analogy. As explained above, modality infuses
properties in a way that vagueness does not. Modality not only infuses proper-
ties; modality also infuses states of affairs. Consider the state of affairs of Anisha’s
wearing a purple shirt. Let [φ(x)] name the state of affairs of x’s φ-ing. So [Pa]
names the state of affairs of Anisha wearing a purple shirt. That state of affairs is
contingent: although it obtains, it isn’t necessary that it obtains. More formally,
we have:
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(40) ∃x(x = [Pa]∧ (Ox ∧¬(Ox)))
where ‘O’ predicates obtainment of states of affairs. More generally, we can
state the claim that there are possible contingent states of affairs as:
(4:) ◊(∃x(Ox ∧¬(Ox)))
Contingency infuses states of affairs, but if there is no metaphysical vague-
ness, indeterminacy does not infuse states of affairs. States of affairs are deter-
minate:
Determinate States of Affairs (DSA) Í (∀x(Ox→Í (Ox)))
Prima facie, (DSA) does a nice job capturing the idea that reality is not vague
even if our language is. Even though the language we use to describe states of
affairs is vague, the states of affairs themselves are not vague. We might worry
that, like prior attempts to state theses of metaphysical vagueness, (DSA)makes
metaphysical vagueness trivial. Any theory of vagueness should allow that it’s
indeterminate whether Harry is bald. But then, they should allow that it’s
indeterminate whether the state of affairs of Harry’s being bald obtains. Doesn’t
this violate (DSA)?
It does not. It may be indeterminate whether the state of affairs of Harry’s
being bald obtains, but, as I’ve been stressing, that doesn’t entail that there is
something such that it’s indeterminate whether that thing obtains. An oppo-
nent of metaphysical vagueness should say that the singular phrase “the state
of affairs of Harry’s being bald” is a vague singular term for states of affairs that
definitely obtain or definitely do not obtain – states of affairs likeHarry’s having
less than 50,000 hairs. More formally, the claim that it’s indeterminate whether
the state of affairs of Harry’s being bald obtains is:
(42) ÏO[Bh]
But (42) does not entail the de re claim:
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(43) ∃xÏOx
And it is this de re claim that would violate (DSA).
(DSA) puts pressure on proponents of deflationary vague existence to admit
metaphysical indeterminacy. The intuitive source of the pressure is that states
of affairs are structured. That is, they involve various objects and properties.
For example, the state of affairs of Obama’s being president involves the object
Obama and perhaps the property being president. In general, the state of affairs
picked out by [φ(a)] where ‘a’ is a proper name, involves a.
The claim that states of affairs are structured in this way is supposed to
be quite weak. I don’t mean to be making any controversial claims about the
state of affairs being grounded in the objects they involve. Nor do I mean to
be making the claim that states of affairs that involve objects have haecceitistic
obtainment-conditions unique to states of affairs that involve that object.28 All I
mean to claim is that states of affairs have objects as constituents.
Plausibly, the existence of an object comes with an obtaining state of affairs
which involves that object. So, if we cannot rule out some X s composing a
table, we cannot rule out an obtaining state of affairs involving that table. But if
(DSA) is right, then it’s determinate that every obtaining state of affairs deter-
minately obtains. But that obtaining state of affairs, which involves the table,
cannot obtain without the table that it involves. Thus, that table definitely
exists.
Let’s try to formalize the above reasoning. Introduce the two place predicate
‘I ’ so that ‘xI y’ says that an obtaining state of affairs x involves the object y in
the way the state of affairs of Obama’s being president involves Obama. It’s
definitely the case that, for every object, there is a state of affairs involving that
object:
(44) Í (∀x∃y(yI x))
28Although, the argument that I make below can be given in these terms as well. All that is
required is a conception of a state of affairs according to which the existence of an object brings
with it a new state of affairs. See Hawthorne (2009, §2) for some relevant considerations.
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From (DSA) we know that every state of affairs definitely obtains; combined
with (44) we can conclude that for any object, there is a state of affairs involving
that object which definitely obtains:
(45) Í (∀x∃y(yI x∧Í (Oy)))
And, states of affairs determinately depend on the objects they involve in order
to obtain:
(46) Í (∀y∀x(yI x→Í (Oy→∃z(z = x))))
But (46) and (45) jointly contradict (VE): determinately everything determi-
nately exists. According to (45), (determinately) each object comes with a state
of affairs that determinately obtains, but by (46), in order to obtain, that state
of affairs must ‘carry’ the object along with it. So, determinately every object
must determinately exist.
8 Two Deflationist Replies
The above argument conceives of states of affairs as having a certain structure to
them. It also claims that if a state of affairs involves an object, then that state of
affairs definitely does not obtain without that object. Presumably, this last claim
is motivated by the assumption that if a state of affairs has a certain structure
to it, it definitely has that structure. Thus, the conception of states of affairs
underlying the above argument is one on which they have definite structure.
And it’s no wonder such a conception of states of affairs causes trouble for
the deflationist. Indeed, outside of the context of vagueness, Hirsch (2002) has
explicitly distanced himself from such conceptions of states of affairs:
...statements involving different kinds of quantifiers can be equally true by virtue
of the same (unstructured) facts of the world.
The notion of a structured fact does, however, raise certain problems for quanti-
fier variance – but...[i]f I change what I mean by ‘a thing’ then I must also change
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what I mean by ‘the way a fact is built up out of things and properties’; hence I
must change what I mean by “a structured fact”....
A problem arises, however, if one wants to say...that each true sentence states one
structured fact. How can we say which one that is...when I am able to ‘translate’
that sentence into a variety of structurally different sentences in my language
having the same truth conditions?...I am inclined to agree with Putnam that,
once we’ve accepted quantifier variance, there is no point in trying to hold onto
language-shaped facts that are in the world independent of language. (78-79)
Hirsch’s discussion inspires two strategies the deflationist may adopt in order to
avoid violations of (DSA), each questioning the conception of states of affairs
with definite structure.
• Strategy One: Accept that there are structured states of affairs, but deny
that the states of affairs have their structure determinately.
• Strategy Two: Deny that there are structured states of affairs.
Strategy one accepts that there are states of affairs with structure – that is,
there are states of affairs that involve objects. But, it can be vague what structure
it has – it can be vague which objects a particular state of affairs involves.
Given that we’re allowing structured states of affairs, presumably (44) will
be unproblematic: every object has a state of affair that involves it. Instead, the
strategy motivates a rejection of (46) – the claim that (determinately) if a struc-
tured state of affairs involves an object, then determinately if that structured
state of affairs obtains, the object exists. This strategy treats the ‘I ’ predicate as
vague. Even if the structured state of affairs cannot obtain without the object
it involves, if it’s vague what object it involves then it need not determinately
‘carry’ the involved object with it in order to obtain. Without (46), (VE) is
consistent with (DSA) – vague existence does not entail vagueness in the ob-
tainment of states of affairs.
I am skeptical that this strategy can be made to work. My reason is closely
related to the reason Hirsch himself isn’t optimistic of this strategy: which new
description will we give to the object-involving state of affairs that we want to
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re-describe as involving a different object? The existence of an object brings
with it an object-involving state of affairs that is distinct and in addition to any
other state of affairs. In some sense of ‘more’, there will be strictly more states
of affairs if some X s compose than if they don’t compose. So, without the thing
that the X s compose, there won’t be enough descriptions to accommodate this
additional state of affairs. Unless we think that distinct states of affairs can have
the same description, or we think that identity can be vague, I am doubtful
that this strategy will work.29 But, let’s set my skepticism aside and turn our
attention to Hirsch’s second strategy.
According to strategy two, states of affairs simply don’t have structure.
Thus, there are no states of affairs that involve objects. So, (44) is false. When we
implicitly quantify over states of affairs with imperfect nominals like ‘Caesar’s
dying’, we are quantifying over unstructured states of affairs.30 Without (44),
(VE) is consistent with (DSA) – vague existence does not require vagueness in
the obtainment of states of affairs.
9 Vagueness in Worldly Structure
On both of Hirsch’s strategies, the argument that (VE) violates (DSA) fails.
Either states of affairs don’t have structure or they have their structure indeter-
minately. This allows the deflationist to retain the claim that (determinately)
every state of affairs that obtains determinately obtains. As far as I can tell,
Hirsch’s strategy – especially his second strategy – succeeds in dodging viola-
tions of (DSA).
In picturesque terms, the core of Hirsch’s strategies is to deny that the world
has determinate structure. That’s either because the world is unstructured
29Much more would have to be said in order to make this argument rigorous – in particular
we would have to get clearer on what we mean by there are ‘more’ states of affairs if some X s
compose than if they don’t compose.
30Contrast imperfect nominals with perfect nominals like ‘Caesar’s death’ which plausibly
pick out events (Casati and Varzi, 20:4).
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(strategy two) or the world has structure but has that structure indeterminately
(strategy one). Note, however, that denying that the world has determinate
structure is itself a sort of metaphysical vagueness, even if it’s not vagueness in
which states of affairs obtains.
It was this indeterminacy that motivated the argument for violations of
(DSA). We treated states of affairs as determinately structured and then claimed
that these structured states of affairs definitely obtain. But talk of states of affairs
was nonessential to expressing the real source of indeterminacy that worried us:
indeterminacy in the structure of the world. We can nominalize talk of struc-
tured states of affairs – an object’s having of a property – by quantifying into
both predicate and object position. Returning to the modal analogy one last
time: contingency infuses these nominalized structured states of affairs – an ob-
ject’s instantiation of a property can be contingent. In higher-order modal logic
we can express this as: ◊(∃X∃x((¬X x)∧ (¬¬X x))). We can nominalize the
claim that (determinately) the world has determinate structure as3:
Determinate Worldly Structure (DS) Í (∀X∀x(X x→Í (X x))
Again, (DS) does not trivialize the claim of metaphysical vagueness. We can
accept that it’s indeterminate whether Harry is bald:
(47) Ï(Bh)
without violating (DS) because we cannot quantify out (47) to deduce
(48) ∃X∃xÏ(X x)
In particular, there need not be a property that ‘B ’ determinately refers to.32
But (DS) entails that there is no vague existence:
i. Í (∀x∃X (X x)) (Assumption /WVC)
3:The idea of nominalizing states of affairs in this way in order to test for metaphysical
vagueness comes fromWilliamson (2003).
32C.f. Williamson (2003)
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ii. Í (∀X∀x(X x→Í (X x))) ((DS))
iii. Í (∀x∃X Í (X x)) (from (i) and (ii))
iv. Í (∀X∀x Í (X x→∃y(y = x))) (Assumption / (B))
v. Í (∀x Í (∃y(y = x))) (from (iii) and (iv))
(i) claims that (determinately) every object instantiates some property. This
follows from the (WVC) schema above and is independently plausible. (ii) is
the statement of (DS): that (determinately) if something has a property, it’s
determinate that it has that property. While higher-order logic is controversial
(even without indeterminacy operators), (iii) straightforwardly follows from (i)
and (ii), so we can conclude that (determinately) everything has some property
that it determinately instantiates. (iv) is the Being constraint which claims that
definitely something must exist in order to instantiate a property. Together
with (iii), the Being constraint straightforwardly entails (v), which contradicts
(VE).
I see no way that the deflationist can avoid violations of (DS): they must ad-
mit that there is vagueness in the structure of the world. Indeed, I think many
deflationists should embrace this result, as capturing the metaphysical heart of
their position.33 In his discussion of structured facts, Hirsch (2002) makes a ges-
ture towards this picture of the world: “we can retain the notion of an unstruc-
tured fact. I think this is indeed our most basic notion of “reality,” “the world,”
“the way it is,” and this notion can remain invariant through any changes in
our concept of “the things that exist”’ (79). While Hirsch admits that the world
lacks determinate structure, he thinks that the unstructured nature of the world
is determinate. We can express this unstructured determinacy by quantifying
directly into sentence position.
Determinate Unstructured World (DUW) Í (∀S(S→Í (S))
33Many thanks to David Manley for pushing this line with me (and eventually convincing
me that violations of (DS) is of a piece with their metaphysical view).
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While deflationists must deny (DS), they can retain (DUW). This captures their
commitment to the determinacy of the world’s unstructured nature.
:0 Conclusion
Ontological deflationists often market themselves as defenders of ‘common-
sense’ metaphysics. It’s thus important that their views vindicate a common-
sense realism according to which the world is independent of the way we speak.
Because deflationists tie questions of existence to our language and thought, op-
ponents worry that the tie between the mind-independent world is too close –
that it makes the world objectionably dependent on our language and thought.
Some old-school deflationists, like Putnam, were happy to wear their anti-
realism on their sleeves. More contemporary deflationists are not willing to
give up the realism battle as easily as their predecessors. They are eager to show
that their views on ontology are consistent with any world-independence thesis.
Flat-footed statements of realism are often phrased as modal independence
theses: if we had spoken differently, such-and-such objects would have still ex-
isted. And, as ontological deflationists have correctly pointed out, their views
are consistent with these modal independence theses. Other statements of re-
alism appeal to controversial metaphysical gizmos like ‘structure’ or ‘truth-
making’ which the deflationist can reject. Ontological deflationists are too
slippery to stick them with an anti-realist thesis. For many though, a suspi-
cion remains that ontological deflationists still tie the world too closely to our
language.
I’ve suggested that one way to develop this suspicion is to see the extent to
which the deflationist is committed to metaphysical vagueness. If their position
leads to vagueness in the world as a result of vagueness in the word ‘exists’ that
is a sort of anti-realism. Our investigation revealed the extent to which the de-
flationist must admit that there is vagueness in the world. They are committed
to vague existence (regimented as (VE)) and this vague existence requires them
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to accept vagueness in the structure of the world (regimented as (DS)). But, the
extent of the metaphysical vagueness has a limit: the unstructured world remains
determinate (regimented as (DUW)).
We can put the deflationist position loosely as: the real world is unstruc-
tured. Our results thus converge with the results of other studies of deflation-
ism, like that of Sider (2009, 20::), according to which deflationists claim that
fundamentally the world doesn’t have any quantificational structure. And we’ve
done so without having to appeal to controversial metaphysical gizmos like
structure or grounding.
Is the deflationist picture of an unstructured world one that we can ulti-
mately accept? I’m not sure.34 But as far as I can tell, evaluating this picture
requires us to do more metaphysics. Thus, far from deflating metaphysics, on-
tological deflationism is just more metaphysics.
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